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Introduction chapter: Thesis overview 
The overarching aim of this thesis is to study features of goal motivation and 
the self-regulation of personal goals which have been implicated in the development 
and maintenance of depression (Trew, 2011; Van de Elzen & Macleod, 2006; Wrosch, 
Scheier, Carver and Schulz, 2003). This thesis consists of two main chapters: a 
narrative literature review and an empirical paper. Each chapter, together with how 
they are linked is outlined in this introductory chapter.  
Chapter 1 
The context for the review is set by providing a brief background on the 
prevalence of depression and highlighting the present lack of research which 
examines goal motivation within depression. A brief overview of goal motivation and 
goal self-regulatory research and theory is provided to contextualise the review and 
to establish the need to extend our understandings of these areas within depression.  
Following this the narrative review is structured around its two main aims. 
Firstly, the review develops an understanding of depression from a dysregulation of 
goal adjustment perspective. This chapter of the review focuses on research which 
has examined two specific goal adjustment processes (i.e. goal disengagement and 
goal re-engagement) conceptualised by Wrosch, Scheier, Carver and Schulz (2003). 
This area of research has largely focused on an individuals’ ability to reduce their 
effort and commitment towards and unattainable goal and re-engage with alternate 
goals (Wrosch, et al., 2003; Wrosch, 2011). The review highlights the main findings 
which have suggested a relationship between maladaptive goal adjustment 
responses to unattainable goals and a vulnerability to depression (Wrosch, 2011). 
The review identifies limitations of previous research and identifies the need to 
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undertake further research in clinical populations. This need is addressed as one the 
main aims of the empirical paper.   
The second aim of the review focuses on research which has examined the 
influence of rumination in mediating goal adjustment processes and depressive 
affect. The review discusses the findings from studies which have posited a pathway 
to depression linked to rumination, whereby this response impairs goal 
disengagement and prevents the re-engagement with more realistic and rewarding 
goals. The review identifies the limitations of these studies and suggests important 
areas for future research. Specifically, the need to address what may predispose 
individuals to adopt a maladaptive ruminative response to problematic goal 
attainment. The chapter concludes by presenting potential clinical implications from 
the studies in the treatment of depression and suggests directions for future 
research. 
Overall, the narrative review sets the context for the empirical paper, which 
follows in the subsequent chapter. Specifically, the need to undertake research 
within a clinical population examining whether distinct goal adjustment processes 
are a feature of depressed individuals in responding to unattainable goals. Also, the 
need to investigate additional processes which predispose individuals to respond 
ruminatively to problematic goal attainment and may potentially mediate the 
relationship between goal adjustment and depression. These issues are revisited and 
addressed within the empirical paper.  
Chapter 2 
 This chapter presents the empirical paper, which is intended for publication 
and is written in the style of the journal identified for submission (Motivation and 
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Emotion). The empirical paper aims to further study goal motivation and the self-
regulation of unattainable goals within depression. The paper presents the key 
theoretical models and research in the area of goal motivation. There is a discussion 
of goal motivation research which has linked depression to distinct types of goals, 
characterised by different types of goals (approach goals vs avoidance goals). Also, 
recent research is presented which has examined whether depression biases 
cognitive aspects of goal motivation, specifically goal expectancies (Dickson, Moberly 
& Kinderman, 2011). To date, there has been a paucity of research examining goal 
orientation and goal expectancies within depression, despite the proliferation of goal 
based therapies. An additional impetus outlined for further research within a clinical 
population is the mixed findings reported by previous studies regarding goal 
motivation within depression.  Therefore, the present study examined the goal 
orientation (approach vs avoidance) and goal expectancies of depressed individuals 
relative to non-depressed individuals.  
 Following this, the key theoretical models and research which have been 
linked to the self-regulation of unattainable goals is presented. The empirical paper 
attempted to build upon the understandings from the narrative review. Also, the 
study examined whether depressed and non-depressed individuals differ in their 
reporting of their goal adjustment tendencies. This was intended to identify if 
distinct goal adjustment processes are a feature of depressed individuals. The study 
attempts to identify processes which may predispose an individual to engage in 
maladaptive rumination in response to problematic goal attainment, which may 
mediate the relationship between goal adjustment and depression. Therefore, the 
present study aimed to establish whether metacognitive ruminative beliefs mediate 
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the relationship between goal adjustment and depression. Previous research has 
suggested that these beliefs influence an individuals’ engagement in rumination in 
response to a stressor and have been implicated in depression (Moulds, Yap, Kerr, 
Williams & Kandris, 2010). 
 A discussion of the present study findings is also presented which offers 
interpretations of the study results as well as their relevance to previous research, 
which has been undertaken. Methodological considerations of the study are 
discussed, alongside the clinical implications of the study findings and future 
directions for research.  
Summary 
In summary, this thesis aims to develop a greater understanding of 
depression from a goal motivation and goal regulation perspective. First, a narrative 
review presents two primary aims, (i) to provide an understanding of the 
dysregulation of goal adjustment processes (goal disengagement and goal re-
engagement) in responding to an unattainable goal linked to depression (ii) the 
influence of rumination, in response to unattainable goals, as a vulnerability 
contributing to the maintenance and exacerbation of depressive mood, through 
disruption of goal adjustment processes. Second, an empirical paper presents three 
main aims (i) to examine the goal orientation (approach vs avoidance) of depressed 
and non-depressed individuals (ii) to examine the goal expectancies of depressed 
individuals compared to non-depressed individuals (iii) the goal adjustment 
tendencies of depressed compared to non-depressed individuals in responding to an 
unattainable goal and, (iv) the mediation of metacognitive ruminative beliefs upon 
goal adjustment and depression. 
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Overview  
Depression remains a serious mental health concern (The National Institute 
of Clinical Excellence, 2012). Presently, depression accounts for seven per cent of the 
health expenditure within the National Health Service (Department of Health, 2012). 
Improved recognition, treatment, and prevention of depression are critical public 
health priorities (DoH, 2012). Despite an increased understanding and ongoing 
developments in the treatment of depression there remains a need to identify new 
and more effective interventions (Hervas & Vazquez, 2013). To date, the advances 
and development of psychological therapies for depression have focused largely on 
cognitive and behavioural features. In contrast, little research has examined the role 
of motivational processes within depression (Tull, Gratz, Latzman, Kimbrel, & Lejuz, 
2011).  
Emerging goal based motivational research has implicated distinct goal 
motivational processes in depression rather than by a goal motivation deficit per 
(Dickson, Moberly & Kinderman, 2011). In addition, there is increasing interest in 
models of goal self-regulation (O’Connor, Fraser, Whyte, Machale & Masterton, 
2009). More recently there has been a particular interest in an individuals’ capacity 
to relinquish unattainable goals in relation to wellbeing (Wrosch, Amir, & Miller, 
2011). This body of research suggests that a dysregulation of goal processes in 
response to unattainable goals may constitute a vulnerability to depression (Dickson 
& Mcleod, 2004; Trew, 2011; Van den Elzen & Macleod, 2006;  Wrosch & Miller, 
2009; Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, & Schulz, 2003a; Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, Schulz & 
Carver, 2003b).  
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The purpose of this narrative literature review is to study goal motivation in 
depression. First, a brief summary will be given to contextualise the narrative review 
in terms of the prevalence of depression and in relation to the relevance of 
motivational goal theory and goal regulation theory. The motivational theory 
underpinning goal behaviour will be outlined and its reported relevance to 
depression. Also, the summary will indicate the need to develop a greater 
understanding of goal self-regulatory processes in connection to the onset and 
maintenance of depression. Following this summary the review will focus on its two 
primary aims; first, to study the dysregulation of goal adjustment processes (goal 
disengagement and re-engagement) in responding to unattainable goals (Miller & 
Wrosch, 2007; Wrosch et al., 2003a; Wrosch et al., 2003b) and associations with 
depression. Current theoretical models will be critically discussed in relation to the 
regulation of unattainable goals; identifying the need to develop these theories as 
explanations of the link between goal adjustment and depression.  
Following this the second aim of the review is to discuss rumination 
proneness, in response to unattainable goals, as a vulnerability contributing to the 
maintenance and exacerbation of depressive mood, through disruption of goal 
adjustment processes (Van Randenborgh, Huffmeier, Lemoult, Joorman, & Roberts, 
2010). There have been few studies that have directly explored this understanding of 
depression. Nonetheless, current research has suggested that rumination may inhibit 
effective goal disengagement from unattainable goals, preventing the re-
engagement with realistic and potentially rewarding goals; thus elevating levels of 
depressive mood and constituting a heightened risk to depression (Van 
Randenborgh, et al., 2010). Theoretical models of the self-regulation of goals will be 
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critically discussed to propose that a maladaptive ruminative response may account 
for a dysregulation of the processes within these theories. To date, these theories 
have not been well studied in their application to clinical populations  
Finally, the findings of the reviewed studies will be discussed in terms of their 
potential clinical implications in the treatment of depression. Recommendations are 
suggested for future research in to the relationship between goal self-regulation and 
depression.  
Search methods and results 
Three electronic databases (Web of Science, Scopus and PsycINFO) were 
searched for relevant literature published between the commencement of the 
journals up to January 2014. Two structured searches were conducted relevant to 
the narrative review’s two aims. The initial search focused on goal disengagement, 
re-engagement processes and depressive symptoms. The search strategy combined 
free text words and synonyms of search terms to capture relevant research. The 
search terms included goal disengag*, goal engag*, goal adjustment, goal adaption, 
self-regulation, unattainable goal,  depression, low mood, dysphoria, wellbeing. The 
second search strategy focused on the influence of rumination on goal 
disengagement and goal re-engagement processes. The search terms included; 
ruminat*, self-focused attention, repetitive negative thinking, self-referent* 
thinking, negative thinking, cognitive coping style, cognitive response, goal 
disengag*, goal engag*, goal adjustment, goal adaption, self-regulation, unattainable 
goal. The search identified twenty four full text papers which were chosen and from 
which relevant information was extracted. The second search identified twelve 
papers from which data was also extracted.  
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In addition, inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied to select the papers 
from the two structured searches. The inclusion criteria included: papers with 
samples of participants aged 16 and above, english language papers, papers that 
focused on the area of subjective wellbeing or mental health within the abstract as 
well as papers specifically relevant to goal disengagement and re-engagement 
processes. Exclusion criteria, included papers with samples aged below 16 years of 
age, non-english language papers as well as papers that focused on education or 
physical health. In addition to the selected papers from the structured search, 
additional papers and textbooks discussed within these papers, with relevance to the 
review were also referred to and discussed.  
Depression  
Depression is characterised by a loss of interest or pleasure in most activities 
and a tendency to engage in passive unrewarding behaviour (Thompson, Mata, 
Jaeggi, Buschkuel, Jonides & Gotlib, 2010).  The estimated prevalence for major 
depression among 16-65 year olds in the UK is at 21/1000 (NICE, 2012). Recently 
released figures from the National Wellbeing programme (Office of National 
Statistics, 2013) reported that nearly one fifth of adults were currently experiencing 
depression or anxiety in the United Kingdom.  Depression often has a remitting and 
relapsing course, and symptoms may persist between episodes. The evidence 
suggests that at least 50% of people following their first episode of major depression 
will go on to have at least one more episode (NICE, 2012). Relapse rates for 
depression suggest that after the second and third episode, the risk of further 
relapse rises to 70% and 90% respectively (NICE, 2012). The economic cost of mental 
health problems in England has been recently estimated at £105 billion (DoH, 2012). 
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Treatment costs are expected to double in the next twenty years (DoH, 2012). 
Therefore, it is imperative not only to increase access to psychological therapies but 
also to provide effective therapies. In order to improve treatment outcomes, this 
requires identifying the variety of intrapersonal factors that may influence the 
course and severity of depression and engagement in therapy (DoH, 2012; Sherratt 
& Macleod, 2013).   
In this regard, despite the fact that the most commonly used treatments for 
depression encourage the setting of explicit therapy goals, comparatively little 
research on depression has been undertaken from a goal motivation perspective. 
Goal motivation processes have a significant impact on the course of depression and 
response to treatment (Sherratt & Macleod, 2013). Research has identified that 
distinct goal motivation processes and the regulation of goals are important features 
of depression. Such findings emphasise the need to improve our understanding of 
depression from a goal motivation perspective. This has important implications for 
clinical practice to enable the development of more effective and tailored goal-based 
therapies (Roberts, Watkins & Wills, 2013; Vergara & Roberts, 2011). A further 
impetus to better understand the link between goal motivation and depression has 
been the proliferation of National Health Service ‘Improving Access to Psychological 
Therapy’ programmes, predominantly delivering Cognitive Behavioural Therapies; a 
therapeutic approach within which goal setting is considered a fundamental feature.  
Motivational goal theory  
A number of theoretical models have been developed to explain the 
motivational processes linked to depression (see Trew, 2011 for a review). Theories 
converge on the idea that goal pursuit is fundamentally driven and managed by two 
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distinct self-regulatory subsystems, an approach and an avoidance system (Elliot & 
Thrash, 2002). This two system view of goal motivation has been conceptualised in a 
number of earlier models of motivation, for example, Gray’s (1982) prominent 
Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST). Gray’s (1982) theory posits two subsystems, 
a Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS) and a Behavioural Approach System (BAS). The 
BIS is related to sensitivity to punishment as well as avoidance motivation, while the 
BAS is related to sensitivity to reward as well as approach motivation. Fowles (1994) 
theorised that depression is characterised by low approach motivation (low reward 
sensitivity) and high avoidance motivation (high threat sensitivity). 
Goals are considered a cognitive representation of underlying motivation 
(Dickson et al., 2011). Personal goals have been defined as internal representations 
of desired states and undesired end states (Strauman & Wilson, 2010). Consistent 
with early motivational theory more recent goal self-regulation theories posit that all 
goal pursuit is fundamentally an approach-driven activity or and an avoidance-driven 
activity.  Further, Elliot and Thrash (2002) contend that all goals are structured as 
either approach goals or avoidance goals. Approach goals are orientated to positive 
outcomes and involve goal directed pursuits to move toward or to maintain a 
desired end state. Conversely, avoidance goals are focused on negative outcomes 
and goal pursuits are orientated to inhibiting or preventing aversive end states ( 
Elliot, 2002 for a review). There have been mixed findings of the link between 
approach and avoidance goal motivation and depression (see, Trew, 2011 and 
Bijttebier, Beck, Claes, & Vandereycken, 2009 for a review). Generally, it has been 
suggested that depression is characterised by impaired approach goal pursuit 
(Bijttebier et al., 2009). In contrast, some studies suggest that depression is 
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characterised by an increased focus on avoidance goal pursuit, however these 
finding are far more mixed (Trew, 2011). This has led Sherratt & Macleod (2013) to 
argue that there remains a need to study the link between goal orientation and 
depression using clinical samples, in order to clarify the earlier studies findings. They 
assert that the few studies that have directly studied the idiographic goals and 
motivations of depressed people have presented inconsistent patterns of goal 
motivation.  
 Self-regulation of goals  
Furthermore, there has been limited research examining the association 
between depression and the regulation of goals. Karoly (2006) suggests that the 
onset and maintenance of ‘human adjustment problems’ within the Diagnostic 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) can be linked to deficits, dysfunctions 
or disruptions in the self-regulation of  goals. In addition, an individual’s capacity to 
adaptively respond to unattainable goals has been linked to their risk of experiencing 
depression (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Miller & Wrosch, 2007; Wrosch et al., 2003b; 
Wrosch & Miller, 2009). Studies have suggested that affect and goal response 
interact in the regulation of unattainable goals (Carver, 2000; Carver & Scheier, 
2000). It has been recommended that research should focus on maladaptive 
emotional response and goal dysregulation to facilitate a better understanding of 
these relationships within depression (Miller & Wrosch, 2007; Thompson, Mata, 
Jaeggi, Buschkuel, Jonides & Gotlib, 2010; Van de Elzen & Macleod, 2006; Van 
Randenborgh, Hueffmeier, LeMoult & Joormann, 2010). 
The self-regulation of goals is characterised by three broad interactive 
processes: establishing standards or goals, engaging in goal directed behaviour, and 
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monitoring goal progress (Carver, 2006). Carver and Scheier’s (1990) Control Theory 
claims that affect modifies behavioural output. For example, increase or withdrawal 
of effort when negative affect is experienced and a decrease or re-allocation of 
effort when positive affect is experienced (Louro, Pieters, & Zeelenberg, 2007). 
Researchers have hypothesised that a dysregulation of the behavioural processes 
described within control theory may explain the onset and maintenance of 
depression. Such as, inflexible goal pursuit, reduced effort but maintenance of 
commitment towards an unattainable goal, difficulties disengaging from problematic 
goal attainment and lack of re-engagement in alternate rewarding goals (Watkins, 
2008; Watkins, 2011; Wrosch & Miller, 2009).  
There has been a paucity of research within this area despite the potential 
theoretical and clinical importance of studying the relationship between depression 
and the regulation of goals (Brandstatter, & Schueler, 2012; Miller & Wrosch, 2007). 
There remains a need to advance our understanding of the relationship between a 
dysregulation of goal processes and depression as well as identifying individual 
differences that may mediate the experience of depressive symptoms (Miller & 
Wrosch, 2007; Wrosch et al., 2011). The narrative review next looks at a body of 
research which has focused on goal adjustment processes (goal disengagement and 
goal re-engagement) and rumination proneness, in the self-regulation of 
unattainable goals and vulnerability to depression (Hervas, 2013; O’Connor, 
O’Carroll, Ryan & Smyth, 2012; Van Randenborgh et al., 2010; Wrosch et al., 2003a; 
Wrosch et al., 2003b).  
Goal adjustment (goal disengagement and re-engagement) in response to 
unattainable goals and vulnerability to depression 
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Wrosch et al. (2003b) conceptualised goal adjustment as characterised by 
two distinct processes: goal disengagement and goal re-engagement. Goal 
disengagement is the process of relieving psychological distress by reducing 
commitment to and withdrawal of effort towards an unattainable goal, preventing 
repeated goal failure. On the other hand the primary function of goal re-engagement 
is to provide purposeful future orientated goals and is aimed at increasing positive 
aspects of subjective wellbeing. Studies have reported that when individuals are 
faced with discrepancies between their present state and their perceived goal end 
states they implement regulatory strategies that either engage with a goal and try to 
attain it or disengage from the goal (Hasse, Heckhausen, & Wrosch, 2013). Carver & 
Scheier’s (1998) Control Theory suggests that individuals will experience elevated 
levels of psychological distress in situations where a person desires a valuable goal 
and is unable to make further progress toward the goal. Therefore, in certain 
circumstances it may be adaptive to recalibrate or disengage from goals (Klinger, 
1975; Wrosch, Miller, Scheier, & Brun de Pontet, 2007; Wrosch & Miller, 2009).  
An individual’s dispositional inability to let go of unattainable goals has been 
linked to negative  ‘downstream’ implications for many outcomes of development 
and well-being including mental and physical health, immunological functioning and 
longevity (Brandstatter, Herrmann, & Schueler, 2013; Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 
2010; Wrosch et al., 2011). In relation to mental health, impaired disengagement 
from unattainable goals and subsequent difficulties re-engaging with alternate goals 
has been associated to a number of adverse outcomes including depression, suicide 
and self-harm (Miller & Wrosch, 2009; O’Connor et al., 2009; O’Connor, O’Carrol & 
Smyth, 2012; Wrosch, Bauer, & Scheier, 2005; Wrosch et al., 2007, Wrosch et al., 
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2011).  Despite the proposed significance of this self-regulatory capacity in relation 
to affective disorders there has been a lack of empirical research which has 
investigated goal adjustment processes within clinical populations. 
Theoretical models of goal adjustment in response to unattainable goals 
A number of theoretical models have been developed to describe the stages 
which may be experienced in disengaging from an unattainable goal. Klinger’s 
Incentive-Disengagement Cycle (1975), one of the earliest models to introduce the 
concept of goal disengagement has elicited renewed theoretical interest 
(Brandstatter, 2002; Brandstatter et al., 2013; Wrosch et al., 2011). Brandstatter et 
al. (2013) has developed two theoretical accounts from Klinger’s model (1971) to 
explain goal adjustment. These include the earlier assimilative and accommodative 
model of goal adjustment (Brandstatter & Rothermund, 2002) and the more recently 
developed Action Crisis theory (Brandstatter & Schueler, 2012).  Goal disengagement 
and goal re-engagement processes are a central feature within these theoretical 
accounts (Hasse et al., 2013). The theories delineate stages of disengagement 
associated with affective and cognitive responses which are hypothesised to 
facilitate disengagement from unattainable goals and re-engagement with alternate 
goals. At present these theoretical accounts have been under applied to nor make 
explicit hypotheses regarding the onset and maintenance of depression. 
Klinger’s Incentive-Disengagement Cycle (1975) has not been tested 
empirically but posits a four-phase sequence which is activated whenever a goal is 
considered either unattainable or no longer considered worthwhile pursuing. The 
four sequences outlined are; invigoration (individual tries harder to reach their goal), 
aggression (if efforts go astray), depression (phase of resignation and inner 
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distancing from the goal) and recovery (commitment to goal withdrawn and open to 
pursue alternate goals). Klinger (1975) suggested depression was a normal part of 
the disengagement process and may facilitate disengagement from personal goals.  
A limitation of this model is that it does not offer an explanation of how 
depression becomes prolonged and a maladaptive feature. Also, Klinger’s model 
offers insufficient attention to specify mediating variables that might affect the 
nature, course or duration of the incentive disengagement cycle or specific reactions 
which may compromise the cycle. The model needs to be developed to account for 
affective and cognitive processes that may be linked to difficulties disengaging from 
an unattainable goal (Brandstatter et al., 2013). There remains a need to identify 
factors underpinning deficient goal disengagement and the maintenance and 
exacerbation of depressive mood.  
  Brandstatter and Schueler (2012) has developed two theoretical models to 
understand goal adjustment processes in response to an unattainable goal. The 
earlier model postulated assimilative and accommodative processes which are 
conceptually similar to disengagement and re-engagement processes. Assimilative 
processes involve attempts to reduce losses by corrective activities. In contrast, 
accommodative processes involve disengagement from blocked goals. Brandstatter 
and Rothermund (2002) assert that when faced by unattainable goals the delayed 
engagement of accommodative mechanisms may increase the intensity and duration 
of depressive reactions. More recently Brandstatter et al. (2013) developed the 
concept of Action Crisis. Action crisis is defined as a point when setbacks in goal 
pursuit accumulate and the individual is juxtaposed between further goal pursuit 
and disengagement. The theory refers to the role of affect and cognition in the 
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disengagement from unattainable goals. The theory is consistent with early work by 
Carver and Scheier (1998) which addressed the role of expectancies in goal 
disengagement i.e. if goal expectancies are low then an individual will be more likely 
to disengage from attempts to attain the goal. The concept of action crisis postulates 
that it is necessary to devalue the goal’s desirability and attainability in order to 
facilitate disengagement (Brandstatter & Schueler, 2012).  
The theory of Action Crisis requires further study within clinical populations 
and its relevance to the development and maintenance of depression. Nevertheless, 
it is possible that prolonged and unresolved Action Crises may constitute a 
heightened risk of depression. Research has suggested that increased emotional 
distress is associated with difficulties in resolving Action Crises (Brandstatter &  
Schueler, 2012).  Individuals may be more prone to experience higher levels of 
distress, in relation to the emotional regulatory strategies they adopt, following an 
action crisis. Herman and Brandstatter (2013) reported that state-orientated (e.g. 
emotion focused coping) compared to action-orientated (e.g. problem focused 
coping) responses to Action Crises may lead to the maintenance of distress and more 
adverse outcomes (e.g. heightened depressive symptoms, difficulties re-engaging in 
alternate goals and repeated experiences of failure). On this basis a vulnerability to 
an escalation of depressive affect may be characterised by the coping response an 
individual adopts in disengaging from an unattainable goal. Depression may be 
characterised by a prolonged and failed resolution of an Action Crisis. Therefore, 
there is a need to identify the range of affective and cognitive responses linked to 
impaired goal disengagement and unresolved Action Crises (Brandstatter et al., 
2013).  
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Empirical research: Goal adjustment processes, unattainable goals and 
vulnerability to depression  
Several studies using non-clinical samples have explored the associations 
between goal adjustment processes (goal disengagement and goal re-engagement) 
and the experience of depressive symptoms. Wrosch et al. (2003a; 2003b) 
summarised a number of studies that found an association between individuals’ 
tendencies to disengage from unattainable goals and goal re-engagement in other 
meaningful activity with low levels of distress and higher levels of subjective 
wellbeing. Similarly, Miller and Wrosch (2007) found that adolescent girls who 
disengaged from unattainable goals showed drops in an immunomarker of the 
body’s inflammatory response. Therefore, this finding suggested that impaired 
disengagement from unattainable goals may place an individual at risk of heightened 
depressive symptoms via systemic inflammation associated with impaired goal 
disengagement. Additionally, it was suggested that persistence in the face of an 
unattainable goal may compromise an individual’s sleep, representing a further risk 
factor to depression. However, this relationship was not explicitly examined within 
their study. Previous research has identified that disengagement from an 
unattainable goal is more significantly related to reductions in depressive symptoms 
(Miller & Wrosh, 2007; Wrosch et al., 2003a; Wrosch et al., 2003b Wrosch et al., 
2007; Wrosch & Miller, 2009; Wrosch et al., 2011). This may be related to the 
hypothesised function of goal disengagement in its ‘freeing’ of resources for the 
pursuit of alternate goals; relieving distress and re-orientating a person’s focus on 
success as opposed to failure (Wrosch & Miller, 2009). 
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A general limitation of the previous studies is that they have predominantly 
relied on non-clinical populations. Similarly, research has not adequately identified 
how and why impaired goal disengagement may be linked to depressive affect, 
despite the suggested link between impaired goal disengagement and elevated 
depressive symptoms (Miller & Wrosch, 2007; Wrosch & Miller, 2009). Nonetheless, 
goal adjustment processes represent an important self-regulatory capacity and 
researchers have suggested that an individual’s goal-regulation tendencies are 
consistent across different pursuits. This may represent a trait-like vulnerability to 
experience difficulties across multiple self-relevant goal domains (Wrosch et al., 
2003a).   
In contrast there have been a few studies reporting that initial depressive 
symptoms may fulfil an adaptive function and facilitate disengagement from an 
unattainable goal; this challenges the view of depression as being a purely 
maladaptive response (Keller & Nesse, 2006; Wrosch & Miller, 2009).  Several studies 
have supported this view. For example, Van den Elzen and Macleod (2006) found 
that elevated depressive symptoms facilitated disengagement from cognitive plans 
related to unattained goals. Similarly, Wrosch and Miller (2009), in a longitudinal 
study found that adolescent girls with higher baseline depressive symptoms 
developed increased goal disengagement capacities which were subsequently 
associated with a decline in depressive symptoms. 
On the basis of these findings, Van den Elzen and Macleod (2006) 
hypothesised that impaired goal re-engagement subsequent to goal disengagement 
may place individuals at greater risk to depression. It has been suggested that a 
deficit in formulating new plans would leave an individual ‘chronically disengaged’ 
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from a previous unattained goal but not engaged in an alternate activity, therefore 
at increased likelihood of becoming depressed.  Van den Elzen and Macleod (2006) 
have suggested that whilst depressive symptoms may facilitate disengagement from 
an unattainable goal, difficulties formulating new plans and re-engaging in alternate 
goals might characterise depressed individuals. These theoretical assumptions have 
been based on studies relying on non-clinical populations who were experiencing 
sub-clinical levels of depressive symptoms. This limits the ability to generalise from 
these findings. Consequently, any conclusions concerning goal adjustment 
responses, which may prolong depressive symptoms, must await the outcome of 
future research using clinical samples.  
Despite a paucity of research into goal adjustment within depression and 
although not directly related to depression, two recent studies have reported 
adverse mental health outcomes (suicidal ideation and self-harm) associated with 
distinct goal adjustment profiles in responding to unattainable goals (O’Connor et al., 
2009; O’Connor et al., 2012). O’Connor et al. (2012) explored goal adjustment 
processes within a sample of patients with a history of attempted suicide, 
experiencing a range of emotional distress, including depressive symptoms. The 
study participants were followed up two years after their attempted suicide. The 
study found that participants who reported high disengagement and low re-
engagement were at high risk for suicidal ideation and self-harm. In addition, low 
disengagement from unattainable goals predicted self-harm re-hospitilisation.  The 
study suggested two distinct goal adjustment profiles in response to an unattainable 
goal that may place an individual at heightened risk of adverse outcomes. These 
profiles included impaired goal re-engagement subsequent to goal disengagement 
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and impaired goal disengagement from an unattainable goal. Therefore, it will be 
important to establish if these profiles are found across affective disorders.  Also, the 
study may highlight goal adjustment features and their salience to the higher levels 
of self-harm and suicide found within depressed individuals, which O’Connor et al. 
(2012) relate to ‘chronic goal failure.’ A limitation of O’Connor et al’s. (2012) study is 
that it did not establish whether a lack of re-engagement arises from an inability to 
generate alternative goals (e.g., feeling as if there are no other options) or other 
obstacles such as a basic amotivational orientation toward new alternatives. There is 
a need to address the deficit within the research regarding the obstacles which 
result in poor mental health outcomes and impair an individual’s capacity to 
disengage and re-engage in potentially healthier and more rewarding alternate 
goals.  
Comparatively less research attention and importance has been given to goal 
re-engagement rather than goal disengagement. Despite it being a process that may 
be equally important in the self-regulation of unattainable goals and its associated 
affect (Wrosch et al., 2011). There have been mixed findings regarding the influence 
of goal re-engagement in attenuating depressive symptoms (Miller & Wrosch 2007; 
Wrosch et al., 2003b; Wrosch & Miller, 2007; Wrosch et al., 2011). Heckhausen & 
Heckhausen (2010) have theorised that goal re-engagement, may reduce depressive 
symptoms, involving shifts in goal pursuit and refocusing on positive aspects of a 
new goal; for example, intrusions and rumination about goal failure. Similarly, 
Wrosch et al. (2003b) predicted that individual differences in the capacity to identity 
new goals should be differentially attributable to higher levels of purposeful future 
orientated thoughts and lower levels of failure-orientated thoughts. However, at 
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present, it has not been found with any consistency, across studies involving non-
clinical populations, that the process of goal re-engagement has a ‘buffering effect’ 
on depressive symptoms (Wrosch & Miller, 2009; Wrosch et al., 2011;). Generally, it 
has been suggested that goal re-engagement may exert a weaker effect on 
depressive symptoms compared to goal disengagement. This has been linked to the 
premise that the primary function of the process is not specifically to relieve 
depressive symptoms (Wrosch & Miller, 2009).   
An alternative explanation concerning goal re-engagement may be that the 
positive impact of goal re-engagement is reduced if an individual remains committed 
to an unattainable goal but reduces the effort they exert towards attaining or 
disengaging from the goal (Hadley & Macleod, 2010; Wrosch et al., 2011). An 
individual may need to sufficiently disengage both their effort and commitment from 
the unattainable goal in order to experience the rewarding benefits of goal re-
engagement. This view is supported by previous research that has suggested that the 
‘buffering effects’ of goal re-engagement may be ineffective if an individual 
withdraws effort but remains committed to and unable to disengage from an 
unattainable goal (Wrosch et al., 2003a; Wrosch et al., 2007; Wrosch et al., 2011). 
Impaired disengagement from an unattainable goal may leave an individual 
vulnerable to repeated experiences of failure. This accumulation of negative affect 
with subsequent difficulties re-engaging in alternate, potentially rewarding goals 
represents a possible pathway to depression (Strauman, 2002; Strauman & Wilson, 
2010). Furthermore, Dickson et al. (2011) found specific cognitive responses to goals 
differentiated depressed individuals from non-depressed individuals. Depressed 
individuals were characterised as having more pessimistic expectancies regarding 
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their goals. Thus, lower expectancies of achieving future goals may impact on an 
individual’s capacity to re-engage with alternate goals. This reinforces the need to 
identify cognitive factors that may mediate goal re-engagement processes and be 
implicated in the onset and maintenance of depression.  
In addition, the hypothesised weaker effect of goal re-engagement on 
reducing depressive symptoms is discordant with currently recommended 
behavioural treatments for depression (e.g. behavioural activation; NICE, 2012). This 
therapy is aimed at increasing the frequency and quality of pleasant activities based 
on the finding that a core deficit within depressed patients is low rates of pleasant 
and rewarding activities (Dimidjian, Hollon, Dobson, Schmaling, Kohlenberg et al., 
2006). Previous findings regarding goal re-engagement may be limited in their 
validity because of a reliance on non-clinical populations who experience 
significantly lower levels of depressive symptom in comparison to clinical 
populations. Therefore, it is possible that goal re-engagement may fulfil an 
important function in conjunction with goal disengagement within clinically 
depressed individuals experiencing higher levels of depressive symptoms.   There is a 
need to research the twin function and relationship between goal adjustment 
processes within a clinical population. This is particularly important given that 
impaired goal disengagement may compromise the adaptive function of goal re-
engagement. This is consistent with Brandstatter & Rothermund’s. (2012, p.118) 
assertion that ‘goals turn into sources of dissatisfaction and depression when they 
become unattainable or exceed individual resources—at least when the persons 
remain committed to them.’ 
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As mentioned earlier, depression has been linked to distinct goal profiles 
characterised by approach and avoidance motivation (Trew, 2011). However,  goal 
adjustment focused studies have not explicitly identified nor qualitatively 
differentiated between the approach and avoidance orientation of unattainable 
goals, in relation to goal disengagement (Miller & Wrosch, 2009;; Wrosch et al., 
2003a; Wrosch et al., 2003b; Wrosch et al., 2005; Wrosch & Miller, 2007; Wrosch et 
al., 2011). It is possible that differential goal orientations may affect disengagement 
from an unattainable goal and the re-engagement with alternate goals. Research in 
other areas has found that individuals holding approach goals may have a greater 
capacity to generate alternate goal pursuit strategies in comparison to the impact of 
avoidance goals (Lench & Levine, 2008).  
An inability to generate alternate goal pursuit strategies may limit the ability 
of people with avoidance goals to disengage from an unattainable goal, owing to the 
perception that their present goal may be their only opportunity to avoid failure. 
Furthermore, avoidance motivated individuals have been reported to have greater 
difficulties recognising when to disengage from an unattainable goal, becoming less 
able to disengage, following depressive mood and thoughts related to potential 
failure (Lench & Levine, 2008). A clinical hypothesis has been constructed from this 
study suggesting that inflexible goal regulation, associated to avoidance goals and 
lower levels of approach goals, may impair disengagement from an unattainable goal 
and represent a vulnerability to depression. 
There are a number of limitations which may restrict the ability to generalise 
from Lench and Levine’s (2008) findings to a clinical population. First, a non-clinical 
sample was used and therefore it remains to be seen if the study findings are 
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replicated within a clinical sample. Second, the study operationalised goal 
disengagement as the point at which participants forwarded to the next task within 
the study. This definition is limited given that people who behaviourally stop 
pursuing a goal may still value and remain consciously committed to the goal 
(Wrosch et al., 2003b). The paucity of available research examining the interaction 
between goal orientation, goal adjustment and depressive symptoms, may be a 
reflection of currently there being only one objective measure available to identify 
goal adjustment (Wrosch et al., 2003a). This measure does not distinguish the 
relationship between goal orientation and goal adjustment processes. In order to 
undertake further research within this area there is a need to develop an 
appropriate measure to distinguish goal adjustment processes relevant to goal 
orientation.  
Until recently goal adjustment research has not adequately identified 
individual differences, in maladaptive regulatory responses to unattainable goals, 
which may be implicated in the onset and maintenance of depressive symptoms 
(Wrosch et al., 2011). Research has not given adequate attention to the affective and 
cognitive processes in individuals for whom goal disengagement may be impaired. 
More recently, within a student sample, Eddington (2013) found an interaction 
between perfectionism (e.g. individuals with a greater unwillingness to let go of 
unsuccessful goals) and goal disengagement which predicted higher levels of 
depressive symptoms and the use of poor coping strategies, in response to an 
unattainable goal (e.g. isolation, detachment and self-blame). This highlighted the 
influence of cognitive responses to goal pursuit which may mediate goal adjustment 
processes and the experience of depressive symptoms. In addition, Wrosch et al. 
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(2011) found that maladaptive re-engagement processes (e.g. venting and self-
distraction) were associated with a vulnerability to experience heightened 
depressive symptoms. Therefore, maladaptive goal re-engagement processes may 
represent a distinctive feature of individuals who are predisposed to experience 
elevated levels of depressive symptoms.  
Relatively little is known about the relevance of goal adjustment to 
depression and the factors affecting the process, despite the potential self-
regulatory significance of goal disengagement and goal re-engagement. There is a 
significant gap in the literature examining how depressed individuals regulate their 
disengagement from unattainable goals and subsequent re-engagement in alternate 
goals. This indicates a requirement to further investigate vulnerabilities to 
depression associated with the self-regulatory strategies individuals adopt in their 
management of an unattainable goal. One specific process that may shed light on 
maladaptive goal regulation strategies is rumination. Research has highlighted that 
individuals with depression report higher levels of maladaptive e.g. emotion focused 
rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000), yet little is known about how this tendency 
may interact with goal adjustment processes.    
The influence of rumination on goal adjustment (goal disengagement and re-
engagement) and vulnerability to depression  
As previously highlighted in the review, the goal adjustment literature has 
neglected identifying the self-regulatory strategies which may mediate individuals’ 
goal adjustment abilities, in response to an unattainable goal. This may predispose 
some individuals to experience greater difficulties in the self-regulation of 
unattainable goals. On this basis the second aim of the review is to consider research 
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in to the influence of rumination: identified as a potential pathway to depression, 
through deficient goal disengagement (Van Randenborgh et al., 2010). Eddington & 
Foxworth (2012) has suggested that the self-regulation of goals may become 
disrupted when attention is excessively focused internally.  However, it is unclear 
how rumination once activated may interfere with the self-regulation of goals. 
Despite the potential importance of such research in understanding depression from 
a goal self-regulation perspective there have been no direct studies within a clinical 
population which have explored the interaction between rumination and adjustment 
to an unattainable goal.  
Theoretical models of rumination, goal self-regulation, and vulnerability to 
depression  
Theories have been developed to explain rumination distinguishing its 
constructive and unconstructive affects (see Watkins, 2008 for a review). Martin and 
Tesser’s (1989) Goal Progress Theory of ruminative thought describes a sequence of 
processes following the frustration of a goal (e.g. repetition of instrumental 
behaviour, attempting to find alternate routes to the goal, end state thinking and 
negotiation for goal abandonment). The theory conceptualises rumination as a 
response to failure to progress satisfactorily towards a goal, opposed to as a reaction 
to a mood state. Martin & Tesser (1996) posit that rumination is most commonly 
prompted when the individual does not progress towards their goals as planned and 
that rumination is a natural human experience and facilitates self-regulation of goals. 
Martin & Tesser (1996) propose that individuals ruminate about goals they have not 
attained as to evaluate how best to pursue them.   
This contrasts with other theories of rumination, for example, Nolen-
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Hoeksema (1991, p.569) who defined rumination as ‘behaviors and thoughts that 
focus one’s attention on one’s depressive symptoms and on the implications of 
these symptoms.’ This form of rumination has been implicated in the development, 
maintenance, and exacerbation of depressive affect as well as episodes of major 
depression. In light of these differing viewpoints, rumination has been 
conceptualised as either self-focused thoughts to resolve goal attainment or 
conversely self-focused repetitive thoughts associated with a range of negative 
outcomes (Watkins, 2008). Therefore, if the core purpose of rumination is to 
discover alternate pathways to blocked goals, this would be quite useful and 
adaptive when goals are attainable but would be maladaptive when goals are in fact 
unattainable. Similarly, a ruminative response focused on the affect associated with 
adjusting to an unattainable goal could be equally maladaptive.  
The validity of these hypotheses warrants further study. To date, little 
research has been undertaken within clinical populations to examine the relationship 
between the function of ruminative responses described within Goal Progress 
Theory (Martin and Tesser, 1996) and Nolem-hoeskema’s (2000) Response Styles 
Theory, in adjusting to unattainable goals. Whilst juxtaposed, it is the case that these 
theoretical viewpoints focus on differing constructs of rumination.  The former 
conceptualises rumination as focused on unresolved problems and problematic goals 
attainment whilst the latter definition of rumination focuses on mood and its causes. 
Therefore, there is a need for research to establish if differing ruminative responses 
are associated with greater emotional difficulties in the regulation of unattainable 
goals.  
The Goal Progress Theory has not adequately distinguished features that may 
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cause rumination to become constructive or unconstructive and does not address 
individual differences in whether such thought becomes unconstructive or 
constructive. However, subsequent research has  highlighted that rumination can be 
maintained and may become maladaptive if an individual interprets their rumination 
as a sign of inadequacy or losing control and makes attempts to suppress 
rumination. In this scenario rumination may be perceived as a problem as opposed 
to an adaptive response (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2009; Wells, Fisher, Myers, 
Wheatley, Patel, & Brewin, 2009). These tendencies may lead an individual to fail to 
progress towards their goals whilst maintaining maladaptive rumination.  
The Goal Progress Theory was not developed to explain the onset and 
development of depression; however, features of the theory may help to explain the 
interaction between rumination, negative affect and impaired disengagement. For 
example, continued and preservative ruminative thinking, on the discrepancy 
between one’s current state and a desired future state, may lead to increased 
depressive mood, negatively focused rumination and inaction (Watkins, 2008). This 
pattern of response may represent a distinctive feature of individuals at risk of 
developing depression. 
Additionally, Watkins (2008) has proposed that Control Theory (Carver and 
Scheier, 1990) may provide a theoretical framework to guide future research (e.g. to 
help understand how thinking, action and emotional state interact) in to 
understanding the links between rumination, impaired goal regulation and 
vulnerabilities to depression. In line with Carver and Scheier’s (1990) self-regulatory 
Control Theory, a maladaptive ruminative response may disrupt the normative 
interaction between emotions and goals. Rumination may become unconstructive in 
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situations in which an individual is unable to progress in their goal pursuit, whilst 
remaining committed to the goal. Depressive ruminators have been found to have 
difficulties in their flexibility towards regulating cognitive processing in response to 
goal difficulties (Strauman & Wilson, 2010; Watkins, 2008; Watkins, 2011;).  
To date, goal self-regulatory models (Carver, 2006) have not sufficiently 
accounted for the transition from adaptive negative affect, experienced following 
perceived failure to attain and disengage from a personal goal then becoming pro-
longed and a maladaptive feature within depressed individuals (Jones, Papadakis, 
Hogan & Strauman, 2009; Van Randenborgh et al., 2010). At present, it is unclear 
why some people engage in prolonged rumination in response to problematic goal 
attainment. Theories of goal self-regulation need to be further developed in order to 
explain the relationship between depression and the dysregulation of specific 
processes within these models. In depressed individuals the dynamics or processes 
that explain disengagement from personal goals are still not well understood. 
Empirical research: influence of rumination in adjusting to unattainable goals and 
vulnerability to depression  
Individuals need to be flexible when confronted with problematic goal 
attainment, to be able to recognise when to continue effort to goal attainment or to 
abandon or revise unattainable goals (Wrosch et al., 2003b). Studies have suggested 
that ruminative responses to unattainable goals may hinder goal disengagement and 
may represent a trait-like vulnerability to depression (Herman & Brandstatter, 2013; 
Lench, 2008; Trew, 2011; Van Randenborgh et al., 2010). Di Paula and Campbell 
(2002) found that goal related reflections, similar to rumination, may persist for 
some time after goal related behaviour has ceased and represent a trait associated 
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with a high risk for experiencing elevated depressive symptoms. This finding is 
consistent with Schroevers, Kraaij and Garnefski (2007) study which found that 
higher levels of depressive symptoms were associated with maladaptive cognitive 
coping responses to problematic goal attainment (rumination, self-blame, 
catastrophising).  
Moberly & Watkins (2010) reported that the perception of failure to attain 
important, personally relevant goals can lead to increases in rumination and 
depressive symptoms. This finding suggests that the importance of an individual’s 
goal may influence the relationship between rumination and depressive symptoms. 
Similarly, Masicampo and Baumeister (2011) found the continued focus on an 
unattained goal can interfere with attentional resources necessary to pursue other 
alternate goals, particularly when the unattained goal was important to the 
individual. In contrast, Jones et al. (2009) found that in response to goal failure 
individuals who adopted a reflective stance did not experience an increase in 
depressive symptoms. However, moderate to low levels of reflection were 
associated with increased depressive symptoms.  
Research has suggested that emotion focused rumination may prolong the 
impact of perceived failure in goal progress and thereby intensify depressive 
emotional states (Jones et al., 2009; Jones, Papadakis, Orr & Strauman, 2013). The 
previous studies suggest that a vulnerability to depressive affect may be associated 
to the self-regulatory response an individual adopts, characterised by a recurrent 
pattern of ruminative responses, focusing on failure to achieve personal goals; 
thereby exacerbating depressive mood. Also, study findings suggest that an inability 
to divert attention away from important previously unattained goals may restrict the 
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necessary attentional resources to effectively pursue alternate goals. Masicampo 
and Baumeister (2011) suggest that clinically depressed individuals may be more 
susceptible to the effects of unattained goals due to the self-regulatory style they 
adopt.  
The previous studies have a number of limitations. Studies used graduate 
students and non-clinical adult populations, which affects the ability to generalise 
the applicability of the results to a clinical population. In particular, Schroevers et 
al’s. (2007) study used a student sample which may have affected the nature of the 
stress they were reporting in relation to problematic goal attainment goal (e.g. low 
incidence of loss experiences) and their engagement in maladaptive cognitive 
coping. The interaction between an individual’s engagement in maladaptive 
cognitive coping in response to an unattainable goal may be mediated by the 
significance of the loss. In addition, Masicampo and Baumeister (2011) did not 
identify specific cognitive responses which may have influenced an individual’s 
ability to disengage from an unattained goal and focus on alternate task.  Similarly, 
Jones’s et al’s. (2009) study failed to measure whether individuals who failed to 
attain goals were more generally ruminating on past failures which may have placed 
individuals at a greater risk of experiencing more depressive symptoms.Furthermore, 
Jones’s et al’s. (2013) sample was predominantly female which they suggest may 
have inflated the effect size of rumination.  
Importantly, Moberly and Watkins (2010) found that their study variables 
were not associated with emotion-focused rumination.  This may be accounted for 
by the fact that they used non-clinical participants reporting low levels of negative 
affect which may not have elicited emotion focused rumination. It is possible that 
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emotion focused ruminative responses were not associated with their study 
variables (i.e. goal importance and goal success) however this response could be 
associated with other features of goal behaviour that were not explored. 
Furthermore, the ruminative response identified within this study was reflective of 
Martin & Tesser’s (1996) conceptualisation of adaptive rumination (i.e. problem 
focused). The study did not capture dysfunctional forms of rumination which may 
maintain goal discrepancies and prolong distress. Therefore, there is a need to 
identify circumstances that may lead to maladaptive ruminative responses and 
whether this is a feature of depressed individuals.   
In addition, previous research has suggested an interaction between 
rumination and affect, in the regulation of unattainable goals and attainment of 
alternate goals.  Eddington and Foxworth (2012) found that following goal conflict, 
individuals with both high levels of self-focused attention (SFA, a form or rumination) 
and high levels of depressive symptoms, responded with lower performance 
expectancies and reduced effort towards future goal behaviour. This finding may 
indicate self-regulatory vulnerabilities to depression linked to an amotivitional 
attitude to pursue alternate goals, following difficulties in goal pursuit.  In addition, a 
ruminative response may reduce cognitive resources directed towards alternate goal 
pursuit. Similarly, Roberts, Watkins and Wills (2013) reported an interaction 
between rumination, negative affect and goal failure. They found that individuals 
with a higher tendency to ruminate responded to the cueing of an unattained goal 
with prolonged and maladaptive rumination, leading to depressive mood.  
Jones et al. (2013) has proposed a ‘feedforward mechanism’ following 
unattained goals whereby depressive affect and rumination reciprocally interact, 
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transforming acute distress into chronic distress. These studies may explain why 
certain individuals are at greater risk of depression arising as a consequence of their 
engagement in ruminative strategies to regulate goal behaviour. In contrast, Van 
Randenborgh et al. (2010) found that self-focused rumination hindered 
disengagement from unattainable goals but that the effects of rumination were 
independent of mood. This finding may be related to the fact that participants within 
this study, assigned to the rumination condition, reported low depressive scores 
which may have led to them being less responsive to the induction of rumination. 
Therefore, it is uncertain if a similar finding would be reported with higher levels of 
depressive mood.  
There are a number of limitations in these studies with implications for future 
research. Research has relied on non-clinical participants and has focused on goal 
processes in artificial settings with tasks that may have lacked ecological validity. 
Studies with greater ecological validity are needed to examine the influence of 
rumination on goal pursuit and the experience of depressive affect. Also, studies 
have used different measures of rumination which may have captured different 
constructs. As previously discussed, it has not been clearly established whether goal 
dysregulation and higher levels of depressive symptoms are more strongly 
associated with certain aspects of ruminative thought (e.g. problem focused or 
emotion focused). There has been little research examining whether emotion 
focused rumination is associated with more maladaptive responses to goal 
regulation. Research has highlighted a need to more closely examine the relationship 
between maladaptive rumination and goal behaviour which may be associated with 
more affective impairments (Moberly & Watkins, 2010). There is a need to establish 
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how maladaptive ruminative responses may impair effort mobilisation towards 
alternate goals and goal disengagement, maintaining goal discrepancies and 
prolonged distress.  
Finally, as previously discussed, there has been very limited research 
examining the association between goal orientation, goal adjustment and depressive 
mood. Equally, there is a lack of research investigating the influence of rumination 
which may mediate these processes. Despite the lack of research, recent 
motivational goal research has suggested that the orientation of an individual’s goal 
motivation may influence their susceptibility to the effects of rumination and 
experiences of depressive mood.  Kircanski, Mazur and Gotlib (2013) reported that 
low approach motivation increased an individual’s susceptibility to the effects of 
rumination and depleted cognitive resources necessary to engage in alternate goals. 
Also, it has been suggested that heightened avoidance motivation may contribute to 
difficulties disengaging from unattainable goals by restricting access to positive 
sources of reinforcement and by facilitating negative information processing (Trew 
2011).  
These findings demonstrate that susceptibility to the effects of rumination 
and goal adjustment may be linked to the orientation (approach or avoidance) of 
goal motivation. Present research has not directly studied these variables within a 
clinical population but such research may help to develop a deeper understanding of 
goal motivation and goal self-regulatory vulnerabilities linked to the onset and 
maintenance of depression. 
Clinical implications 
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Karoly (2006, p.1) suggests that ‘the asking and answering of dynamic 
questions about the day-to-day flow of goal episodes, particularly in symptomatic or 
vulnerable persons, should also have practical implications for psychotherapy and 
prevention.’ Similarly, there are clinical implications for the treatment of depression 
arising from these studies which need to be interpreted cautiously prior to further 
research involving appropriate clinical populations.  
Subject to this caveat, studies suggest that clinical attention should be given 
to processes of goal adjustment. Also, that therapy should be structured to facilitate 
cognitive strategies to enable successful goal identification and pursuit (O’Connor et 
al., 2012; Van Randenborgh et al., 2010). In supporting individuals, that it may be 
useful to locate the specific processes or reasons behind their goal adjustment 
difficulties. From a goal self-regulation perspective, Trew (2011) concluded that 
helping depressed individuals to disengage from unobtainable goals, either 
temporarily or permanently, may improve treatment outcomes by increasing 
resources for behavioural activation.  
In contrast, Wrosch and Miller (2009) assert that goal disengagement 
warrants psychotherapeutic acknowledgement where intervention techniques are 
aimed at strengthening an individual’s goal disengagement capacities. Also, 
suggesting that failure to address this may leave an individual committed to 
unattainable plans and vulnerable to relapse. Van den Elzen and Macleod (2006) 
suggest that therapeutic interventions should focus on an individual’s capacity for 
disengagement from goal plans that have become ‘obsolete’, as opposed to 
interventions solely focusing on reducing depressive mood state, as this may 
decrease their capacity to disengage from such plans in the future.  
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A number of therapeutic techniques may facilitate the disengagement from 
unattainable goals. Macleod and Conway (2010) have posited that some individuals 
struggle to disengage from some goals because they believe that their future well-
being (happiness, self-worth, fulfilment) is dependent on those goals being achieved. 
Therefore in enhancing psychological flexibility in adjusting to unattainable goals 
therapeutic strategies from Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) may prove 
useful (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masudo, & Lillis, 2006).  ACT uses acceptance and 
mindfulness strategies mixed in different ways with commitment and behaviour-
change strategies, to increase psychological flexibility. These techniques may enable 
individuals to get in touch with their ‘values’ and discover what is important to one’s 
true self. Also, reactivate ‘committed action’ through the setting of alternate goals 
according to their values. Importantly, this may enable individuals to relinquish 
unattainable goals and reengage in alternate rewarding goals.  
In addition, interventions from Cognitive Behavioural Therapy may support 
the disengagement from unattainable goals. Behavioural activation treatments may 
help individuals redirect towards more meaningful and realistic goals thereby 
promoting disengagement from unrewarding goal pursuits. Also, cognitive 
restructuring techniques may be salient to the disengagement from unattainable 
goals. Firstly, such techniques may raise an individual’s awareness of negative 
thinking linked to their struggle disengaging from unattainable goals. Secondly, 
stimulate a re-evaluation of negative interpretations (e.g. ‘my future wellbeing is 
depended on the achievement of all my goals’) and possibly help an individual 
reframe their goals in a manner supportive of disengagement. Finally, enhancing an 
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individual’s social, coping and problem solving skills may assist the development of 
instrumental skills necessary for effective goal regulation. 
Additional findings highlighted that, in response to goal difficulties, cognitive 
strategies play an important role in the level of depressive symptoms. This too may 
have important implications for therapeutic interventions (Schroevers et al., 2007). 
Taken collectively, theoretical models of depression which combine motivational and 
cognitive aspects may improve treatment outcomes (Eddington & Foxworth, 2012). 
This is particularly relevant to individuals prone to ruminate which can prolong 
recovery from depression (Jones et al., 2013; Roberts et al., 2013). Therapeutic 
intervention may assist depressed individuals if focused on the formulation and 
execution of cognitive plans to resolve goal difficulties (Van den Elzen & Macloed, 
2006). This is not an uncommon goal within most conventional cognitive therapies. It 
has been suggested that it may be more therapeutically beneficial to engage in 
cognitive restructuring, whilst depressive affect remains present, rather than 
through either psychological or pharmacological interventions, aimed at attenuating 
depressive affect (Van Randenborgh et al., 2010).  
Future research recommendations 
To reiterate, despite the self-regulatory significance of goal disengagement 
and goal re-engagement, relatively little is known about the relevance of these 
processes to the onset and maintenance of depression. Similarly, the factors 
affecting goal disengagement and goal re-engagement have been under-researched 
(Wrosch et al., 2011). Wrosch et al’s. (2003b) explanation of effective 
disengagement (i.e. both the reduction of commitment and effort towards a goal) 
suggests that an individual may be vulnerable to depression from repeated 
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experiences of failure where effort is reduced but without a similar reduction in 
commitment to disengaged goals. This pattern of response may be linked to the 
onset and maintenance of depression and should be examined within future 
research. 
Research is therefore required to examine specific, differentiated goal 
adjustment responses to unattainable goals which have been hypothesised as 
representing a vulnerability to depression. For example, impaired goal 
disengagement and difficulties re-engaging in alternate goals following 
disengagement from an unattainable goal (O’Connor et al., 2012; Van den Elzen & 
Macloed, 2006). Also, future research should track the availability of alternative 
goals, within clinical populations, as well as individual motivation to engage in new 
goals. This is to determine the extent to which the availability of alternate goals 
influences goal re-engagement (O’Connor et al., 2012).  
To date there has been an absence of research that has explored the 
potential theoretical relevance of goal motivation research to other areas of study 
which have also been implicated in depression. Specifically, the area of Learning 
Theory which posits that depression is a consequence of person’s interaction with 
their environment (Lazurus, 1968). It could be suggested that goal motivation 
research offers a new lens and perspective to learning from a motivational 
perspective; particularly in the study of depression.  
Research has rarely examined goal motivation and depression in regards to 
learning theory. However, tentative links could be hypothesised between the two 
areas and the onset and development of depression. For example, in regards to 
approach goal motivation, individuals who perceive themselves as doing poorly on 
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goal progress towards desirable outcomes may be more vulnerable to depression 
whereas individuals who perceive themselves as making good progress may 
experience more positive experiences which in turn promotes wellbeing (Dickson et 
al., 2011). In terms of learning, perceived goal progress and movement towards 
desirable goal outcomes is likely to enhance goal commitment as well as bolstering 
and sustaining goal effort in the face of obstacles. Furthermore, it could be 
anticipated that successful approach goal pursuit is likely to reinforce such behaviour 
in the future as it is anticipated that individuals will experience positive affect 
through such achievement. Therefore, it is proposed that this would create a 
positive reinforcing cycle for such behaviour in the future. Whereas individuals 
failing to reach desirable outcomes (approach goals) may have less opportunity to 
experience positive reinforcement therefore goal pursuit and learning may become a 
more negative and laboured experience. In more severe cases of impaired goal 
pursuit or chronic goal failure it is likely to lock a person in depression and hinder 
learning capacity and motivation for learning.  The integrative potential of 
motivational theory and learning theory warrants further attention.’ 
To date, preliminary studies have started to examine the importance of goal 
disengagement but have been limited in scope and need to be considered in relation 
to other relevant constructs (Watkins, 2008). From further consideration, there may 
emerge a number of as yet unexplored factors that may mediate individual 
capacities to disengage from an unattainable goal (Brandstatter et al., 2013; Hadley 
& Macleod, 2010; Wrosch et al., 2003a; Wrosch & Miller, 2009). In general, goal 
adjustment processes within depressed individuals represent an important but 
under-researched area. Future research also needs to identify other additional 
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factors that may mediate an individuals’ capacity to regulate affect through a 
process of goal adjustment (O’Connor et al., 2012; Wrosch et al., 2003b).  
Various pathways through which rumination has been linked to depression 
have been well-researched (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). 
However, a pathway to depression where rumination is linked to hindered goal 
disengagement is an area which remains comparably under-researched within 
clinical populations (Van Randenborgh et al., 2010; Watkins, 2008). In this regard, 
Watkins (2008) recommended closer examination of goal disengagement and its 
relationship with rumination given the established link between these processes and 
the impact on mental health (Rasmussen, Wrosch, Scheier, & Carver, 2006; Wrosch 
et al., 2003a; Wrosch et al., 2011).  Research is required to examine whether 
rumination represents an antecedent to depression, through deficient goal 
disengagement and to clarify if rumination proneness mediates the relationship 
between goal adjustment and depression (Van Randenborgh et al., 2010).   A clinical 
question remains with regard to why some people persist in engaging in prolonged 
goal related reflections, which adversely affects their mental health, whereas others 
are more readily able to disengage. There is a need to identify the additional 
cognitive processes which may mediate an individual’s engagement in rumination, in 
the context of self-regulation of unattainable goals. Moulds, Yap, Kerr, Williams and 
Kandris (2010) suggest that an important determinant of individual engagement in 
rumination in response to negative mood (e.g. disengaging from an unattainable 
goal) is the extent to which the individual holds beliefs about the usefulness of 
rumination. This is an important area for future research of goal adjustment and 
depression. 
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Abstract 
Goal motivation and goal regulation processes have been implicated within 
depression. This study examined whether depressed participants differed from 
controls on their approach and avoidance goal pursuit, goal expectancies, goal 
adjustment and whether metacognitive ruminative beliefs mediated goal adjustment 
and depression. Depressed participants (N=42) were recruited from two Improving 
Access to Psychological Therapy clinics. Control participants (N=51) were recruited 
from the same region. Participants generated personal approach and avoidance 
goals and completed self-report measures on goal likelihood, goal adjustment and 
depressive symptoms. Depressed participants also completed measures on 
ruminative metacognitive beliefs. Depressed participants reported fewer approach 
goals, gave lower likelihood judgements for approach goal outcomes and higher for 
avoidance goal outcomes. The groups did not differ on number of avoidance goals. 
Depressed participants reported higher goal disengagement and lower goal re-
engagement than controls. Finally, negative metacognitive ruminative beliefs 
significantly mediated an indirect relationship between goal re-engagement and 
depression. Findings highlight goal motivation and goal self-regulatory processes 
which characterised depressed individuals.  
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Introduction 
Distinct goal profiles and the dysregulation of goal processes have been 
linked to depression (Johnson, Carver & Fulford, 2010; Wrosch, Scheier, Carver & 
Schulz, 2003). Despite its theoretical importance, there has been limited research 
examining goal motivation within depression (Mcevoy, Law, Bates, Hylton & Mansell, 
2013; Sherratt & Macleod, 2013). Motivational goal research has reported mixed 
findings regarding the association between distinct goal processes and depression. It 
remains somewhat unclear whether depression is characterised by either blunted 
goal motivation or by a profile of low approach and high avoidance motivation 
(Bijttebier, Claes & Vandereyeken, 2009). Research is required to develop an 
understanding of the relationship between goal motivation and depression (Brown, 
2012; Carey, 2011; Higginson, Mansell & Wood, 2011).  
Depression has been linked to dysfunctions in goal motivation sub-systems 
(Hervas & Vazquez, 2013). These have been theorised in Gray’s (1982) 
Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory, which proposes two independent motivational 
systems; approach and avoidance. Fowles (1994) characterised depression by low 
approach and high avoidance motivation. Non-clinical adolescent studies have lent 
support to Fowles’ theoretical assumptions (Dickson & Macloed, 2004; Dickson & 
Macloed, 2006). Clinical studies have tended to report a deficit in approach 
motivation in depression (McFarland, Shankman, Tenke, Bruder, & Klein, 2006) 
However, findings have been more mixed concerning avoidance motivation (Grawe, 
2007; Spielberg, Heller, Levin Silton, Steward, & Miller, 2011). Bijttebier, Claes and 
Vandereyeken (2009) concluded that high avoidance motivation may represent a 
‘state dependent characteristic’ of depression whereas low approach motivation 
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represents a ‘true vulnerability marker.’ Few studies have directly examined 
individuals’ approach and avoidance goals within depression and the evidence 
supporting the approach-avoidance characteristic in depression is mixed with a need 
to extend research within clinical populations (Sherratt & Macleod, 2013). Therefore, 
the first aim of this study is to investigate whether depressed individuals report 
fewer approach goals and more avoidance goals than non-depressed individuals. 
Goal expectancy is also central to motivation and is important in determining 
the effort an individual exerts towards future goals and the likelihood of success 
(Carver, 2006; Carver & Scheier, 1998). The Reformulated Learned Helplessness 
Theory (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978) and Hopelessness Theory 
(Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989) posit that individuals’ expectancies for future 
outcomes are linked to the development of emotional distress. The theories suggest 
that individuals who attribute negative events to internal, stable, and global causes 
are more likely to experience learned helplessness and are predisposed to 
depression (Johnson, Carver & Fulford, 2010). However, clinical research has 
predominantly focused on expectancies of hypothetical events whereas goal 
expectancies have been neglected in depression studies (Rothbaum, Morling, & 
Rusk, 2009). Despite the lack of clinical research, a recent study by Dickson, Moberly 
and Kinderman (2011) found that depressed participants do not lack valued goals 
but were more pessimistic about their likelihood. Therefore, consistent with these 
findings the present study will examine whether depressed individuals, compared to 
controls, report avoidance goal outcomes as more likely to happen and approach 
goal outcomes as less likely to happen. 
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Individual differences are not well understood in goal self-regulatory 
capacities and depression, despite the exercise of control over goals being 
considered important to mental health (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010; Wrosch et al., 
2003). Control theory proposes that negative affective states are a response to a 
discrepancy between a person’s current state and their desired end-state, 
motivating adjustment or withdrawal of effort and commitment to a goal pursuit 
(Carver, 2006; Mansell, 2005). Control theorists suggest that psychological difficulties 
may be maintained by inflexible control processes (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Mansell, 
2005; Watkins, 2011).  
In line with Control Theory, Wrosch et al. (2003) proposed that goal 
adjustment abilities fulfil an important self-regulatory capacity, underpinned by two 
distinct abilities, goal disengagement and goal re-engagement. These are theorised 
as separate functions in regulating goal behaviour and associated affect. Goal 
disengagement is thought to relieve psychological distress by reducing commitment 
and withdrawal of effort towards an unattainable goal, preventing repeated goal 
failure. Goal re-engagement, on the other hand, provides purposeful future 
orientated goals and increases positive aspects of subjective wellbeing (Wrosch, 
Miller, Scheier & Brun de Pontet, 2007).  
Differences in adjusting to unattainable goals are thought to represent a 
vulnerability marker to depression (Miller & Wrosch, 2007). The most adaptive 
response for mental health is to withdraw effort and commitment away from 
unattainable goals, which has been associated with better mental health outcomes 
(Wallace, Dombrovski, Morse, Houck, Frank, Alexopoulos, 2012). Continued pursuit 
of unattainable goals is suggested to substantially reduce self-regulatory efficiency 
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and pose a risk of depression (Miller & Wrosch, 2007). Generally, goal 
disengagement is thought to be more significant in reducing depressive symptoms 
compared to goal re-engagement (Wrosch, 2011).  
Researchers have hypothesised distinct goal adjustment profiles, in response 
to unattainable goals that may characterise depression. These include both impaired 
goal disengagement (Hadley & Macleod, 2010; Wrosch & Miller, 2007) and impaired 
goal re-engagement processes (Van den Elzen & MacLeod 2006). Pyszczynski and 
Greenberg’s (1987) Self-Regulatory Preservation Theory posits that individuals may 
have difficulties disengaging from important unattainable goals. The theory argues 
that preserved pursuit of an unattainable goal can create a ‘spiralling’ process to 
depression and the development of a depressive attributional style (Trew, 2011).   
In addition, Wrosch, Amir and Miller (2011) suggest that goal re-engagement 
may be compromised if an individual withdraws effort but remains committed to an 
unattainable goal. Reduced motivation to engage in rewarding activities is a 
distinctive feature of depressed individuals which may compromise goal re-
engagement (Sherdell, Waugh & Gotlib, 2012). Similarly, an increase in depressive 
symptoms has been linked to situations where individuals have re-engaged in 
maladaptive responses (Wrosch et al., 2011). Hopko and Mullane (2008) have 
reported a higher engagement in unrewarding behaviour as a feature of depression. 
To date, no study has directly compared clinically depressed and non-depressed 
individuals’ responses to unattainable goals. The next aim of this study compared 
the goal adjustment capacities (i.e. goal disengagement and goal re-engagement) of 
clinically depressed and non-depressed controls in their response to unattainable 
goals.  
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Furthermore, we know very little about specific psychological processes 
which may maintain or exacerbate emotional intensity following goal failure (Van 
Randenborgh, Huffmeier, Lemoult & Joorman, 2010). Maladaptive responses to 
problematic goal attainment may constitute a heightened risk of depression 
(Watkins, 2008).  Rumination has been identified as one such regulatory process 
which may compromise goal adjustment. Research has suggested rumination 
proneness may exacerbate depressive symptoms through impairment of goal 
adjustment processes (Van Randenborgh et al., 2010; Watkins, 2008).  However, goal 
self-regulatory research has not clearly established additional cognitive factors that 
may predispose individuals to engage in such maladaptive rumination, in responding 
to an unattainable goal.  
There remain important unanswered questions. Specifically, what factors 
determine the regulation of unattainable goals and why do people remain attached 
to goals that are unattainable and fail to engage with alternate goals (Wrosch, et al., 
2011). Watkins (2008) has focused on the area of problematic goal attainment and 
suggested that metacognitive ruminative beliefs held by depressive ruminators will 
elicit unconstructive rumination; leading to inflexible goal regulation and reduced 
cognitive resources to resolve problematic goal attainment. These beliefs may 
predispose an individual to focus on their emotions (i.e. self-referent information) as 
opposed to problem solving (i.e. goal-directed action). 
Contrastingly, Martin and Tesser’s (1996) Goal Progress Theory posits an 
adaptive function to rumination. The theory posits that unattained goals initiate 
recurrent thinking about the goal to facilitate effective self-regulation. However, 
secondary appraisals of the experience of rumination (i.e. metacognitions) may 
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mediate the generation of negative affect and perceived maladaptiveness of this 
response (Martin & Tesser, 2006; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2009; Watkins, 2008). 
Research in metacognition has reported that rumination can be maintained and 
become maladaptive if an individual interprets it negatively (i.e. negative 
metacognitive beliefs; Wells, Fisher, Myers, Wheatley, Patel, & Brewin, 2009) and 
makes attempts to suppress rumination. Therefore, in response to problematic goal 
attainment such beliefs may alter the adaptive function of rumination to facilitate 
resolution of goal-based discrepancies.  
It has been suggested that rumination is initially adopted with the intention 
of resolving goal-based or meaning-related discrepancies (Martin & Tesser, 2006). 
This may prolong individuals difficulties encountered in adjusting to an unattainable 
goal where metacognitive ruminative beliefs are strong. Positive metacognitive 
ruminative beliefs may lead individuals to engage in excessive and unconstructive 
rumination, in response to a stressor (e.g. disengaging from an unattainable goal), 
limiting regulatory abilities (e.g. problem solving or active coping; Papageorgiou & 
Wells, 2001b; Watkins, 2008). In addition, metacognitive ruminative beliefs have 
been found to mediate the relationship between rumination and depression 
(Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003). Research has not directly studied the relationship 
between goal adjustment, metacognitive ruminative beliefs and depression, despite 
these processes being suggested as vulnerabilities to depression. The final study aim 
is to examine whether the relationship between goal adjustment processes and 
depression is mediated through metacognitive ruminative beliefs.  
In summary, the hypotheses for the study aims are, compared to controls, 
depressed individuals will (i) generate more avoidance goals and (ii) less approach 
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goals (iii) report lower expectancies for future approach goal outcomes and (iv) 
higher expectancies for avoidance goal outcomes happening to themselves (v) report 
lower goal disengagement and (vi) lower goal re-engagement in response to an 
unattainable goal. Finally, it was predicted that in the depressed sample negative 
and positive ruminative meta-beliefs would mediate the (vii) the relationship 
between goal disengagement processes and depression and the (viii) relationship 
between goal re-engagement processes and depression  
Method 
Participant 
Clinical participants were recruited from two National Health Service (NHS), 
Improving Access to Psychological Service (IAPT) sites in the North West. Participants 
were accessing a low intensity cognitive behavioural therapy treatment, delivering 
goal-based approaches to depression (e.g. behavioural activation). Control 
participants were recruited from the community within the same region. The total 
sample (N=92) comprised 57 females and 35 males. The depressed and control 
group did not differ significantly on the proportion of men and women   (X2 =101, 
df=2, >0.05) or age (t(91)=-.77, p>0.05) 
Depressed group Forty-two participants (25 women, 17 men; age 16-67 
years, M=38.50, SD= 13.73) met study criteria for depression. Pre-test screening for 
depression was conducted. Inclusion criteria required: scores in the symptomatic 
range on a measure of depression, The Personal Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9: 
scores of 9 or above), participants had to be aged 16 years or older and at the 
assessment stage of their therapy. Exclusion criteria for the study were consistent 
with DSM-IV criteria and included: substance abuse, psychotic symptoms, bi-polar 
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disorder, head injury, and mood disorder due to a general medical condition. 
Participants were also excluded if they reported current suicidal ideation with plans, 
actions and no protective factors. Due to the present research task requirements 
participants were also excluded if they were not fluent in English.  
 Control Group Pre-test screening was conducted.  No participants scored 
within the symptomatic range or indicated that they were accessing services at the 
time of testing. The control group included 51 participants (32 female, 19 male; age 
21-61, M=36.31, SD=13.40).  Inclusion in the control group required PHQ-9 scores in 
the asymptomatic range (scores < 9; M=1.83, SD=2.17, range=0-8), aged 16 or over 
and participants were not currently receiving support for mental health difficulties, 
including medication or psychotherapy.  
Power calculations 
Power calculations were conducted prior to undertaking statistical analysis. 
As there has been little research examining the study variables in relation to 
depression power calculations were based on Cohen’s (1988) recommendations for 
Behavioural Sciences Research. Therefore, mixed model ANOVA analyses required a 
total sample size of 46 participants in order to detect a medium effect (F = .25) at a 
power level of .80 and an alpha level of 0.05. The t-test statistical analyses required 
64 participants in each group in order to detect medium effects  (d = 0.5), at a power 
level of 0.80 and at an alpha level of 0.05. In addition, effect sizes presented in the 
analyses are also reported in the results. 
Materials 
Personal Health Questionnaire PHQ-9 (Kroenke, Spitzer & Williams, 2001). 
The PHQ-9 is a nine item self-report measure used to assess the presence and 
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severity of depressive symptoms.  Participants rate how often each of the nine 
depressive symptoms has bothered them during the previous 2 weeks, from 0  (not 
at all) to 3 (nearly every day). The measure has good validity and reliability (Martin, 
Rief, Klaiberg, Braehler, 2006). In the present study the reliability alpha was =.90. 
Goals Task (Dickson & Macleod, 2004). Two Independent goal measures 
were used to assess number of self-generated idiographic approach and avoidance 
goals. Participants are instructed to list goals which would typically characterise 
them at some time in the future (e.g. next week, next month, in a few years), using 
short single statements. Goals are described as future experiences that they will be 
trying to accomplish (e.g. ‘to take a summer holiday with friends’) or to avoid (e.g. 
‘to not upset my family’). Prompts were provided to elicit approach goals, ‘In the 
future it will be important for me to’ and avoidance goals ‘In the future it will be 
important for me to avoid.’ To control for variations in task effort, participants are 
given 90 seconds to write down as many personal goals that come to mind which 
may characterise them in each goal condition (approach and avoidance).2 The order 
of the approach and avoidance goal measures were counterbalanced in the goal 
task. 
Goal expectancy (Dickson & Macleod, 2004). This measure was used to 
assess individuals’ approach and avoidance goal expectancy. Expectancy judgements 
for goal outcome were rated from 1 (not at all likely to happen) to 9 (extremely likely 
                                                          
2
 All goals were coded for approach and avoidance to ensure participants followed 
the instructions in each condition. These were confirmed by an independent rater in 
coding goals in each category. There was complete agreement between the author 
and the independent rater. Sixteen avoidance goals were listed in the approach goal 
condition and three approach goals listed in the avoidance condition. These goals 
were excluded  from the count. They accounted for less than 1% of all goals and their 
omission did not affect the results. 
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to happen). In the avoidance condition, a higher score corresponded to greater 
likelihood of failing to avoid the unwanted outcome.  
Goal Adjustment Scale (GAS; Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, Schulz, & Carver, 2003) 
The GAS measures individual differences in general goal disengagement and goal re-
engagement in response to unattainable goals. This is a 10-item measure, four items 
measure goal disengagement and six items measure goal re-engagement. 
Respondents rate the extent of agreement with each item on a five point likert scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Higher scores indicate 
greater ability to disengage (GAS-D) from unattainable goals or to reengage in 
alternate new goals (GAS-R). To measure general goal disengagement and goal re-
engagement participants are asked to rate their agreement with each of the items in 
response to the following statement ‘During their lives people cannot always attain 
what they want and sometimes are forced to stop pursuing the goals they have set. 
We are interested in understanding how you usually react to this when this happens 
to you?’  
Disengagement items measure abilities to reduce effort and commitment 
towards an unattainable goal. The four disengagement items include two items 
measuring reduction of effort and two items measuring relinquishment of 
commitment.  The six goal re-engagement items include two items measuring 
individual tendencies to identify new goals, two items measuring tendencies to 
commit to new goals and two items measuring tendencies to begin active pursuit of 
new goals, when unattainable goals are encountered. The items are summed to give 
a total goal disengagement and goal re-engagement score. The measure has good 
reliability and validity; GAS-D (=84) and GAS-R (=86) (Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, et 
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al., 2003). In the present study the reliability for goal disengagement was =.66 and 
for goal re-engagement it was =.89. 
Positive Metacognitive Beliefs About Rumination  (PBRS; Papageorgiou & 
Wells 2001). The PBRS is a 9-item scale assessing an individual’s positive 
metacognitive beliefs about rumination. Respondents rate the extent to which they 
agree with each of the questions on a four point likert scale ranging from 1 (do not 
agree) to 4 (agree very much). The measure has good reliability ( = .89; Roelofs, 
Huibers, Peeters, Arntz &van Os, 2010). The measure demonstrated good reliability 
in the present study =.94. 
  The Negative Beliefs about Rumination Scale (NBRS; Papageorgiou & Wells 
2001). The NBRS is a 13-item measure assessing negative beliefs about rumination 
and includes two sub scales. The first sub scale (NBRS1) assesses beliefs about the 
uncontrollability and harmfulness of rumination. The second sub scale (NBRS2) 
measures beliefs about the interpersonal and social consequences of rumination. 
Respondents rate the extent of agreement with each item on a 4-point likert scale, 
ranging from 1 (do not agree) to 4 (agree very much). The measure has good 
reliability (=.80) (Luminet 2004; Papageorgiou & Wells 2001). The measure was 
reliable in this study (NBRS1; =.80) and (NBRS2; =.84)  
Goal importance (Dickson & Macleod, 2004) Goal importance was also rated 
from 1 (not very important) to 9 (extremely important). There was no significant 
difference between depressed and control participants on the importance they 
attached to their approach goals (U=838.500, N1=51, N2=42, p>.05, two tailed) or 
their avoidance goals (U=1037.000, N1=51, N2=42, p>.05, two tailed). Therefore the 
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groups did not differ on the subjective importance of the approach and avoidance 
goals. 
Procedure 
Depressed group Ethical approval for this study was obtained through the 
Integrated Research Application System (IRAS) and Research and Development 
teams from the relevant NHS Trusts. University sponsorship approval was also 
obtained. The initial recruitment procedure for the study was amended owing to 
poor recruitment (See appendix A, alternate recruitment procedure). Clinical 
participants were recruited directly from two IAPT clinics in which the researcher 
was based. Service users meeting study criteria were invited to participate by NHS 
staff undertaking therapy sessions. During the therapy session service users were 
provided with a participant information sheet. Those who expressed an interest 
were given the opportunity to further discuss with the researcher following their 
therapy session and if consented completed questionnaires at this point. 
Alternatively, the researcher agreed a convenient time to complete the measures at 
the clinic around their next therapy session. 
Control group A community sample (e.g. church groups and sports centre) 
were recruited in the same geographical region. The study was advertised by flyers 
and the circulation of participant information sheets within the community. 
Participants contacted the researcher by email if they were interested in 
participating in the study. Following consent a convenient arrangement was made to 
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complete the measures. Participants were offered the choice between testing at a 
university location or at home3. University policy for home visits was adhered to. 
Prior to testing participants were informed that testing would not exceed 45 
minutes and that it involved one appointment. Consent was obtained from each 
participant individually prior to undertaking the measures. At the outset of testing, 
participants completed an abbreviated form of the FAS task (Lezak, 1976) to 
familiarise participants with the goal task and to assess written fluency. Participants 
were instructed to write down as many words as possible beginning with the letter 
‘F’ within 90 seconds. There was no significant group difference on number of words 
generated, t(91)=1.83, p>.05, which suggests that the groups were equivalent in 
written fluency.  Both groups then completed the Goal Task, ratings on Goal 
Expectancy, Goal Importance and depression measures consecutively. The depressed 
group additionally completed two metacognitive rumination measures.    
Data analysis 
First data were screened to check correct data entry and missing values.  
Next, parametric assumptions were examined for t-tests, ANOVAs, and regression 
analyses (mediational analyses). Data screening revealed that approach expectancy 
was negatively skewed across both groups (zs>3.29; Field, 2009).  However, on closer 
inspection of participants’ approach expectancy scores, two extreme outliers were 
identified in the depressed group (zs > 3.29) and one extreme outlier in the control 
group (z > 3.29). In accordance with Tabachnick and Fidell (1996), these univariate 
outliers were assigned a raw score on approach expectancy that was one unit lower 
                                                          
3
 Three participants were tested at a university location the remainder were tested 
at a home location. 
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than the next lowest score. Following this procedure, the approach expectancy 
variable was found to be normally distributed (zs < 2.58; Field, 2009). Parametric 
assumptions were met for all the main study variables (See Appendix B, for full 
details regarding data screening and testing parametric assumptions. 
Separate mixed design ANOVAs were used to compare groups (depressed vs 
controls) on number of approach and avoidance goals, and mean approach and 
avoidance goal expectancies. Subsequent, t-tests were used to examine significant 
interactions more closely. To investigate whether groups differed on mean goal 
disengagement and goal re-engagement independent t-tests were conducted. 
Groups were also compared on the goal disengagement subscales  (i.e. effort and 
commitment) and goal re-engagement subscales (i.e. identify new goals, begin to 
pursue and commitment towards new goals). Adjusted bonferroni corrections were 
applied to t-tests to compare group differences using an alpha level of 0.025 (Clark-
Carter, 2010). 
Finally, in accordance with Preacher and Hayes (2008) two separate 
meditational analyses were conducted to examine the mediation of goal re-
engagement and goal disengagement processes on depression through positive and 
negative metacognitive beliefs. Meditational analyses were conducted using the 
Process programme on SPSS (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). In the analyses, the 
independent variable was goal adjustment, the mediator was metacognitive 
ruminative beliefs and the dependent variable was depression. Mediation was tested 
for using bootstrapping procedures, based on 10,000 repetitions, and confidence 
intervals were used to interpret significant meditational results. Data were checked 
for normally distributed residuals and homoscedasticity (See appendix B, regarding 
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parametric assumptions). The regression residuals were normally distributed and 
homoscedasticity was within the acceptable criterion (Field, 2009).  
Results 
The clinical characteristics of the depressed group are reported in Table 1. 
Depressed participants ranged in their previous experience of depression, therapy 
and whether they were currently taking medication. The majority of participants 
within the depressed group reported depressive symptoms in the moderate to 
severe range.  
Table 1. Clinical characteristics of depressed group (PHQ-9 range, previous therapy, 
type of therapy, previous episodes of depression and medication)  
 
 
Clinical Characteristics  
 
Depressed group (N=42) 
 
Number                                    % 
 
 
PHQ-9  
Mild  
Moderate 
Moderate to Severe 
Severe 
 
 
 
7                                           17% 
17                                         41% 
15                                         36% 
3                                              7% 
 
Previous therapy   
None 
One  
Two 
 
 
 
25                                         60% 
14                                         33% 
3                                              7% 
 
Type of therapy  
No previous therapy 
Counselling 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT)  
Counselling and CBT separately 
Counselling on two occasions 
 
 
 
25                                         60% 
12                                         28% 
2                                              5% 
1                                              2% 
2                                              5% 
  
 
 
 
77 
 
Previous episodes of depression  
None 
One 
Two  
Three  
Four 
 
 
 
20                                       48% 
11                                       26% 
9                                         22% 
1                                           2% 
1                                           2% 
 
Medication  
Yes 
No  
 
 
 
7                                          17% 
35                                        83% 
 
Number of goals (approach vs avoidance) and group (depressed vs control) 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for number of goals listed and mean 
goal ratings for each group (depressed vs control) in each goal condition (approach 
vs avoidance). 
Table 2. Group means and standard deviations (SD) for number of goals and ratings 
by group (depressed vs control) and condition (approach vs avoidance) 
 
Group 
     
      Number of goals 
Approach         Avoidance 
          
                    Expectancy 
          Approach         Avoidance 
 
Depressed 
 
5.21(2.34)       4.92(1.99) 
 
          6.23(1.37)      5.49(2.00) 
Control 7.18 (2.71)      4.24(2.12)           7.32(1.10)      3.63(1.93) 
 
First a mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with group (depressed vs 
control) as a between-subjects factor and goal type (approach vs avoidance) as a 
within-subjects factor on number of goals. Results showed no significant main effect 
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for group (F (1,91)=2.33, p>.05, ƞ 
 
=.03) Therefore, overall groups did not differ on 
self-generated goals. However, results showed a significant main effect of goal type 
(approach vs avoidance) with participants listing more approach goals than 
avoidance goals (F(1,91)=42.51, p<0.05, ƞ 
 
=32). This main effect was further 
qualified by the predicted significant interaction between goal type and group 
(F(1,91)=28.79, p<.05  ƞ 
 
=.24).  
As predicted, subsequent independent t-tests showed that depressed 
participants generated significantly fewer approach goals (M=5.2, SE=.36) than did 
control participants (M=7.18, SE=.38), (t(91)=3.68, p<.025, d=.77), as can be seen in 
Table 2. Counter to predictions there was no significant difference between groups 
on number of avoidance goals generated by depressed (M=4.92, SE=.31) and control 
participants (M=4.23, SE=.30), (t(91)=-1.61, p>.025, d=-.34). In summary, compared 
to controls, depressed participants were characterised by fewer approach goals, but 
not more avoidance goals.  
Goal expectancy (approach and avoidance expectancy) and group 
A second mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with group (depressed vs 
control) as a between-subjects factor and goal expectancy (approach expectancy vs 
avoidance expectancy) as a within-subjects factor on mean goal expectancy. Results 
showed no main effect for group (F(1,91)=2.34, p>.05, ƞ 
 
=.0.03). However, results 
did show a significant main effect of goal expectancy, (F(1,91)=94.61, p<.05, ƞ 
 
 =.51) 
which revealed that participants judged their desired approach goal outcomes to be 
more likely to occur than their undesired, to-be-avoided goal outcomes. The main 
effect was further qualified by the predicted interaction between group and goal 
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expectancy (F(1,91)=41.51, p<.05, ƞ 
 
 =.31).  
As predicted, subsequent independent t-tests showed that depressed 
participants judged their (desirable) approach goal outcomes (M=6.24, SE=.21) as 
significantly less likely to happen (t(91)=4.26, p<.025, d=.90) compared to control 
participants (M=7.32, SE=.15). As can be seen in Table 2, depressed participants 
judged their (undesired) to-be avoided goal outcomes (M=5.49, SE=.31) as 
significantly more likely (t(91)=-4.53, p<.025, d=.95) to occur than did controls 
(M=3.63, SE=.27).  Thus depressed participants were more pessimistic than controls 
about the likelihood of achieving (desirable) approach goals and judged (undesirable) 
avoidance goals as more likely to occur. 
Goal disengagement and re-engagement  
Two t-tests were conducted to compare depressed and controls on goal 
disengagement and goal re-engagement. Counter to prediction, depressed 
participants reported significantly greater goal disengagement from unattainable 
goals (M=11.07, SE=.49), than did control participants (M=8.94, SE=.36); (t(91)=-3.56, 
p<.025, d=.75). However, as predicted depressed participants reported lower goal 
re-engagement (M=17.40, SE=.73) than did controls (M=21.57, SE=3.93), (t(91)=4.64, 
p<.025, d=.97).  
Goal disengagement and re-engagement subscales 
To more closely examine goal disengagement and re-engagement, groups 
(depressed vs controls) were compared on goal disengagement subscales (i.e. effort 
and commitment) and goal re-engagement subscales (i.e. identify, begin to pursue 
and commitment). As can be seen in Table 3, there was no significant difference 
found between depressed and controls on either goal effort (t(91)=-.06, p>.025, 
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d=0.01) or goal commitment (t(91)=.931, p>.025, d=0.20). Compared to controls, 
depressed participants reported significantly lower goal re-engagement on each of 
the three subscales: identify new goals (t(91)=3.84, p<.025, d=0.81), commitment to 
new goals (t(91)=3.52, p<.025, d=0.74), begin active pursuit of new goals (t(91)=5.06, 
p<.025, d=1.06). In summary, compared to controls, depressed participants reported 
lower levels of goal re-engagement overall and on each of the three goal re-
engagement subscales. However, depressed participants did report overall greater 
goal disengagement but there was no significant difference between the two groups 
on the goal disengagement subscales. 
Table 3. Comparison of group means and standard errors (SE) on goal 
disengagement and goal re-engagement subscales 
  
Depressed 
 
M           (SE) 
 
 
Controls 
 
M        (SE) 
 
 
Goal disengagement  
 
(i) Reduce effort 
 
(ii) Relinquish commitment  
 
 
11.07    (.49) 
 
5.67      (.28) 
 
5.40      (.30) 
 
8.94     (.36) 
 
5.65     (.22) 
 
5.76     (.25) 
 
Goal re-engagement 
 
(i) Commitment to new goals  
 
(ii) Identify new goals  
 
(iii) Begin active pursuit of new goals 
 
17.40    (.73) 
 
5.57      (.27) 
 
6.05    (1.74) 
 
5.79      (.27) 
 
21.57   (.55) 
 
6.80     (.22) 
 
7.33     (.21) 
 
7.43     (.19) 
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Mediational analysis of goal adjustment, metacognitive beliefs and depression 
Using Preacher & Hayes’ (2008) Process Programme in SPSS separate 
mediational analyses were conducted to investigate whether positive and negative 
metacognitive ruminative beliefs, respectively, mediated a relationship between goal 
re-engagement (IV) and depression (DV) and goal disengagement (IV) and 
depression (DV). Mediational analyses were based on the depressed sample and are 
presented below. The mediational analysis focused on depressed participants for 
primarily two main reasons. First, the measure specifically asks participants about 
their beliefs regarding rumination and depressive feelings. Second, the 
metacognitive model of depression (Wells et al., 2009) posits that these beliefs are 
implicated in the onset and maintenance of depression.  
Mediation of goal re-engagement on depression through negative and positive 
metacognitive beliefs  
First, simple regressions showed that goal re-engagement did not 
significantly predict negative metacognitive ruminative beliefs, B=-.37, t(41)=-1.62, 
p>.05 but negative metacognitive ruminative beliefs did significantly predict 
depression, B=.21, t(41)=2.18, p<.05. Simple regressions also showed that goal re-
engagement significantly predicted depression, B=.28, t(41)=2.07, p<.05 . Also, as 
predicted meditational analyses showed negative metacognitive beliefs had a 
significant indirect effect and partially mediated the relationship between goal re-
engagement and depression, B=-0.07, SE=.05, (CI range: -.21,-.02). Meditational 
results also showed a significant direct relationship between goal re-engagement 
and depression, B=.28, SE=.05, t(41)=2.07, p<.05. 
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Next, simple regressions showed that goal re-engagement did not 
significantly predict positive metacognitive beliefs, B=0.06, t(41)=.25, p>.05 and 
positive metacognitive ruminative beliefs did not significantly predict depression, B=-
.08, t(41)=.84, p>.05. Simple regressions did show that goal re-engagement 
significantly predicted depression, B= .28, t(41) = 2.07, p<0.05. Counter to study 
hypotheses, mediational analysis showed that positive metacognitive beliefs did not 
significantly mediate an indirect relationship between goal re-engagement and 
depression, B=-0.00, SE=.03, (CI range: -.10, .02).   
Mediation of goal disengagement on depression through positive and negative 
metacognitive ruminative beliefs  
First, Simple regressions showed that goal disengagement did not 
significantly predict negative metacognitive ruminative beliefs, B=-.56, t(41)=-1.67, 
p>.05 and  negative metacognitive beliefs did not predict depression in this analysis, 
B=.13, t(41)=1.31, p>.05. Simple regressions also showed that goal disengagement 
did not significantly predict depression, B=-.20, t(41)=-.98, p>.05 . Counter to study 
hypotheses, mediational analysis showed that negative metacognitive beliefs did not 
significantly mediate an indirect relationship between goal disengagement and 
depression, B=-.07 SE=.07, (CI range: -.29,.01). Also, there was no significant direct 
effect between goal disengagement and depression, B=-.20, SE=.20, t(41)=-.98, 
p>.05. 
Next, Simple regressions showed that goal disengagement did not 
significantly predict positive metacognitive ruminative beliefs, B=-.18, t(41)=-52, 
p>.05 and positive metacognitive ruminative beliefs did not significantly predict 
depression in this analysis, B=-.05, t(41)=-.52, p>.05. Simple regressions also showed 
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that goal disengagement did not significantly predict depression,  B= -.20, t(41) = -
.98, p>.05. Counter to study hypotheses mediational analysis showed that negative 
metacognitive beliefs did not significantly mediate an indirect relationship between 
goal disengagement and depression, B=.01, SE=.04, (CI range: -.03, .14). Also, there 
was no significant direct effect between goal disengagement and depression, B=-.20, 
SE=.20, t(41)=-.98, p>.05. 
Discussion  
 
This study aimed to examine specific goal processes and ruminative 
metacognitive beliefs, in relation to depression. As hypothesised, depressed 
participants reported significantly fewer approach goals than controls but the groups 
did not differ on number of avoidance goals. As predicted, depressed participants 
reported that future approach goals were less likely to happen and that avoidance 
goals were more likely to happen than did controls. Compared to controls, 
depressed participants reported lower goal re-engagement but counter to prediction 
reported higher disengagement from an unattainable goal. Finally, negative 
metacognitive beliefs partially mediated the relationship between goal re-
engagement and depression but negative and positive metacognitive beliefs did not 
significantly mediate any other relationships between goal adjustment and 
depression. 
The findings offer partial support for Fowles’ (1994) motivational view of 
depression as being characterised by low approach motivation. The findings are also 
consistent with previous research which depicts depression by impaired approach 
goal motivation (McFarland et al., 2006; Spielberg et al., 2011). As such, the findings 
suggest that depressed individuals have greater difficulty generating rewarding and 
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desirable goal outcomes to pursue. This apparent deficit may limit opportunities for 
reward and positive reinforcement in goal pursuit, thus serving to maintain 
depression. The study did not find that depressed individuals were characterised by 
a heightened focus on avoidance goal pursuits, which lends some support to 
Bijttebier et al’s. (2009) view that avoidance motivation may be a ‘state-dependent 
characteristic’ rather than a ‘true vulnerability marker’ to depression. Also, past 
research findings on avoidance motivation in depression has been somewhat mixed 
(Spielberg et al., 2011). 
It has been suggested that biased cognitive appraisals of goals, such as goal 
expectancy, may impair adaptive self-regulation and is implicated in depression 
(Johnson et al., 2010). Consistent with Dickson et al’s. (2011) findings, pessimistic 
goal expectancies were identified as a significant feature of depressed participants. 
Therefore, lower expectancies of achieving desirable (approach goals) may reduce 
the effort an individual mobilises towards that goal, reducing their experience of 
positive affect and reward, whilst increasing feelings of depression and 
hopelessness. In addition, depressed individuals were also more pessimistic in their 
expectations of aversive to-be-avoided outcomes occurring. Therefore, an increased 
expectancy on ‘bad’ things happening may be implicated in the onset and 
development of depression. For example, this increased expectancy may strengthen 
the salience of avoidance goals. Consequently, goal behaviour may be occupied by 
persistent attempts to avoid aversive outcomes thereby weakening approach 
pathways; limiting access to alternate potentially rewarding goals. Prior research has 
linked higher expectancies of to-be avoided outcomes with heightened levels of 
attentional control to prevent negative outcomes and increased negative affect 
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(Grawe, 2007; Wollburg et al., 2010). Although past research has indicated that 
pessimistic subjective probability judgements for future hypothetical outcomes have 
been implicated in the onset and maintenance of depression (Abramson et al., 1989; 
Abramson et al., 1978), the present study extends this literature to subjective 
expectancies for future orientated idiographic goals. It could also be argued that 
idiographic goals are more personally meaningful than hypothetical events and 
possess greater ecological validity.  
Counter to predictions, depressed participants reported significantly greater 
disengagement from unattainable goals than controls. A number of explanations 
may help understand this finding. For instance, the finding may suggest that 
depressed individuals are more sensitised to potential goal failure and therefore 
more readily able to identify and disengage from an unattainable goal. However, this 
would be inconsistent with the Self-Regulatory Preservation Theory and the 
hypothesised goal adjustment profiles which have suggested that impaired 
disengagement from unattainable goals is a feature of depression (Miller & Wrosch, 
2007; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Wrosch & Miller, 2007). Alternatively, 
previous research has suggested that there may be instances when disengagement 
represents a maladaptive response, for example, a lack of persistence and 
premature disengagement from goal pursuit (Miller & Wrosch, 2007; Wrosch et al., 
2003). Therefore, the higher goal disengagement reported by depressed individuals 
in this present study may be indicative of this feature.  
While the present findings suggest that depressed individuals more readily 
disengage they also appear to struggle to re-engage in alternate new goals. This may 
leave an individual focused on the failure to attain a personally meaningful goal. 
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Repeatedly experiencing difficulties in re-engaging with alternate goals, following 
problematic goal attainment, may exacerbate a sense of failure to attain a personally 
meaningful goal and hinder the pursuit of new alternate goals thus increasing 
vulnerability to depression. The lower goal re-engagement reported by depressed 
individuals is consistent with Van den Elzen & Macleod’s (2006) suggestion that 
individuals who have difficulty developing new plans would be at a greater risk of 
depression. Difficulty re-engaging in goal pursuit may represent a self-regulatory 
vulnerability marker for depression.  
Finally, as predicted negative metacognitive ruminative beliefs partially 
mediated the relationship between goal re-engagement and depression. This finding 
may suggest that individuals who are predisposed to negatively appraise ruminative 
thought, attempt to suppress ruminative thought or interpret it as a sign of danger 
(Wells et al., 2009). Therefore, in responding to problematic goal attainment such 
beliefs may prolong an individual’s ruminative thought and reduce cognitive 
resources necessary for goal re-engagement. This finding lends support and extends 
Van den Elzen and Macleod’s (2006) view that a reduced ability to re-engage in 
rewarding activity subsequent to goal disengagement may place an individual at risk 
of depression.  
Counter to study hypotheses metacognitive ruminative beliefs did not 
significantly mediate any other relationships between goal adjustment and 
depression. Overall, the findings do not provide support for Watkin’s (2008) view 
that metacognitive beliefs impair the self-regulation of goals nor the view that these 
beliefs mediate the generation of affect related to goal pursuit and prolong 
problematic goal attainment (Martin & Tesser, 2006). In addition, the simple 
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regressions undertaken within the meditational analyses highlighted an inconsistent 
finding in the depressed group, that goal re-engagement positively predicted 
depressive symptoms. This is inconsistent with the proposed theoretical function of 
goal re-engagement. Therefore, these study findings may suggest that depressed 
individuals’ ability to re-engage in alternate goals is not reduced but their ability to 
identify and engage in rewarding goals is reduced.  This is consistent with Sherdell et 
al’s. (2012) view which characterises depression by engagement in passive 
unrewarding behaviour.  
Clinical implications  
Potential clinical implications for the treatment of depression can be drawn 
from study findings. The finding that depressed individuals were characterised by 
impaired approach goal motivation, would lend support to Wollburg et al’s. (2010) 
argument that therapeutic efforts should focus on activating the approach system to 
improve treatment outcomes. This may involve assisting an individual to identify 
pathways to effective goal pursuit focused on rewarding and desirable outcomes. 
The pessimistic goal expectancies, which characterised depressed individuals, also 
highlights the need for therapeutic approaches to focus on restructuring negative 
thinking relating to goals.  In addition, it is possible that strengthening approach 
expectancies may weaken the focus on avoidance expectancies. Depressed 
individuals lower goal re-engagement capacities suggest that therapy should focus 
on assisting individuals to identify new goals and pathways towards re-engaging with 
alternate goals (Sherdell et al., 2010). Activating goal re-engagement among 
depressed individuals may attenuate their depression (Van den Elzen & Macleod, 
2006). These clinical suggestions are consistent with the use of behavioural 
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activation interventions in depression (Dimidjian, Barrera & Martell, 2011). Finally, 
goal focused clinical approaches should also note that personal goals are situated 
within a social context. Therefore, clinicians should attempt to understand goals 
within personal, social and economic circumstances e.g. bereavement and 
unemployment. 
Limitations and future research  
            There are a number of limitations in the present study. The cross sectional 
study design was a limitation, therefore causality cannot be assumed. Also, the cross 
sectional design restricted the opportunity to examine the mediating influence of 
metacognitive ruminative beliefs. Although the sample size was slightly 
underpowered, the predicted significant effects did show quite large effect sizes. 
Another limitation of the study, relates to the GAS (Wrosch et al., 2003). Participants 
responded retrospectively and their responses were not in relation to specific 
idiographic goals. Therefore, this may have biased participant’s self-reports. Without 
specific goals to contextualise the nature of goal adjustment it is uncertain whether 
respondents’ answers reflected an adaptive response.  The non-significant 
mediations for metacognitive ruminative beliefs may be related to the narrow focus 
of the goal adjustment measure. It may also be the case that the focus of the 
metacognitive ruminative measure does not relate well to the constructs of goal 
adjustment. Wrosch et al’s. (2003) measure excludes constructs specific to affective 
responses or broader difficulties associated to goal disengagement and goal re-
engagement. It should also be acknowledged that the indirect meditational effect of 
negative metacognitive ruminative beliefs on the relationship between goal re-
engagement and depression was modest and should be interpreted with caution.  
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Future research would benefit from longitudinal research using experience-
sampling methods (i.e. daily diary method). This approach involves participants 
recording at various time points their experience in real time and can identify 
relationships between variables over a period of time.  An experience sampling 
approach may be a suitable method to capture information regarding an individual’s 
self-regulation of unattainable goals. 
In conclusion, the study has demonstrated a number of key findings which 
have elucidated distinctive features of goal motivation and goal self-regulatory 
processes in relation to clinically depressed individuals. Counter, to prediction, the 
metacognitive ruminative beliefs for the most part did not seem to play a role in the 
relationship between goal adjustment and depression. However, the findings did 
suggest that depression is marked by a blunted approach goal motivation and 
pessimistic goal expectancies i.e. low expectancies of desirable outcomes and high 
expectancies of undesirable outcomes. In addition, the findings revealed that 
depression was both characterised by heightened goal disengagement and reduced 
goal re-engagement. These combined goal processes of goal orientation, goal 
expectancies, and goal adjustment are apt to reinforce and maintain a cycle of 
depression and highlight the importance of understanding the nature of depression 
from a goal motivation and goal regulation perspective.  Future research studying 
both goal motivation and goal self-regulation is integral to the development of more 
effective goal based interventions for depression. 
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Appendix A 
Alternate recruitment procedure  
The study recruitment procedure was amended during the study due to poor 
recruitment. The originally intended recruitment procedure involved staff inviting 
service users during a telephone assessment with the IAPT service. NHS staff invited 
service users to participate in the study and sent an information sheet outlining the 
nature of the research. Interested participants were also asked to provide verbal 
consent to be contacted by the researcher to discuss participation. The researcher 
contacted participants and if participants wished to participate the researcher 
offered a choice to either undertake testing at their home or at the University 
campus. One participant was recruited through this procedure. 
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Appendix B 
Parametric assumptions and data screening 
As previously mentioned prior to conducting statistical analyses, data were 
screened and examined to ensure that parametric assumptions were met. The 
values of kurtosis and skewness were then examined. The z scores for skewness and 
kurtosis were calculated by dividing the respective values by the standard error for 
each value. As shown in Table 4, the z-scores for all the study variables were found 
to be within the acceptable criterion (zs < 3.29; Field, 2009) with the exception of 
approach expectancy.  
Data analysis identified that approach expectancy was negatively skewed 
across both groups (zs>3.29; Field, 2009). Upon closer inspection extreme univariate 
outliers were identified through box plots and stem and leaf diagrams generated 
using the EXPLORE option in SPSS, and these extreme outliers had z-scores > 3.29. 
Specifically, data screening identified two extreme outliers in the depressed group 
with zs > 3.29 and one extreme outlier in the non-depressed group with a raw score 
zs >3.29. In accordance with the method recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell 
(1996), extreme univariate outliers were assigned a raw score on approach 
expectancy that was one unit lower than the next lowest score.  
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Table 4. Study variables Z scores for skewness and kurtosis  
 
 
 
Measures 
 
 
 
          Skewness 
 
Depressed      Controls     
 
 
 
 
               Kurtosis 
 
Depressed       Controls 
 
 
 
Positive beliefs about 
rumination (PBRS) 
 
 
 
    .06                        x 
 
 
      -1.17                 -1.38 
Negative beliefs about 
rumination (NBRS) 
 
  1.51                        x       -1.11                        x 
Goal Disengagement 
 
    .16                   1.36          .37                     .76 
Goal Re-engagement  
 
    .00                   1.20        1.60                     .17 
GAS-R Identify new goals 
 
 -1.17                  -2.38       -1.22                     .84 
GAS-R Commitment to new 
goals 
 
    .21                  -1.86       -1.11                     .80 
GAS-R Begin active pursuit 
 
   -.34                  -1.93         -.54                     .45 
GAS-D Commitment 
 
    .05                  -1.25         -.56                    -.54 
GAS-D Effort 
 
    .33                     .08       -1.25                 -1.18 
Personal Health 
Questionnaire (PHQ-9) 
 
  1.91                   3.93          .57                   1.64 
Number of approach goals 
 
  2.14                   1.62          .66                    -.04 
Number of avoidance goals  
 
  1.08                     .76          .10                     .64 
Approach expectancy 
 
   -.09                  -2.04          .05                    -.20 
Avoidance expectancy 
 
  1.72                   2.14          .10                     .42 
Approach importance  
 
 -5.95                  -1.02      12.05                     .36 
Avoidance importance  
 
  1.44                    2.14       -1.27                 13.27 
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Mixed model ANOVAs 
 
(i) Goal type (approach vs avoidance) and group (depressed vs non-depressed) 
 
In order to conduct mixed model ANOVAs and as previously discussed study 
variables were checked to ensure that they met parametric assumptions. Table 4, 
highlights that the z-scores for both approach and avoidance goals were within the 
acceptable criterion zs<3.29 (Field, 2009). In addition the variables were checked for 
normally distributed residuals. The standardised residuals for approach goals ranged 
from -1.57 to 2.83 and for avoidance goals ranged from -2.18 to 2.62. Cook’s 
distances were also examined, approach goals ranged from .00 to .09 and avoidance 
goals ranged between .00 to .08. Therefore, the standardised residuals suggest that 
a few individuals’ scores exceeded the acceptable criterion of 2.50 (Field, 2009). 
However, all Cook’s distances were less than 1, which suggests these cases did not 
have a significant influence (Field, 2009). Mauchly’s test of sphericity was not 
considered, as this present study only had two repeated measures conditions and it 
is only possible to run this test when you have three or more repeated measures 
conditions. Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance was conducted to test that the 
variances in different groups were equal (i.e. the difference between the variances is 
zero). A non-significant equality of variance was reported for both approach goals 
(F(1,91)=.828, p>.05)  and avoidance (F(1,91)=.125, p>.05) which showed that the 
assumption of homogeneity of variance was not violated i.e. that is the variances 
were not significantly different. 
(ii) Goal expectancy (approach vs avoidance) and group (depressed vs non 
depressed) 
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  Again the z-scores for goal expectancy were within the acceptable criterion 
all zs<3.29 (Field, 2009). The data was also checked for normally distributed 
residuals. The standardised residuals for approach expectancy ranged from -2.65 to 
2.27 and for avoidance expectancy ranged between -2.28 to 2.08. Cook’s distances 
were also checked, approach expectancy ranged between .00 to .09 and avoidance 
expectancy ranged between .00 and .07. Although the standardised residuals 
suggested that a few individuals’ scores exceeded the acceptable criterion of 2.50 
(Field, 2009), however all Cook’s distances were less than 1 which suggests that 
these cases did not have a significant influence (Field, 2009). Levene’s test of 
homogeneity of variance was non-significant for both approach expectancy 
(F(1,91)=2.18, p>0.05) and avoidance expectancy (F(1,91)=.12, p>0.05). Therefore, 
the variances were not significantly different. 
T-tests  
 
(i) Goal type (approach vs avoidance) and group (depressed vs non-depressed) 
 
Two separate independent t-tests were conducted to more closely inspect the 
significant interaction effect between goal type and group. First approach goals and 
group were compared. As previously mentioned the z-scores for this variable were 
within the acceptable criterion. In addition, Levene’s homogeneity of variance was 
non-significant (p>.05, Field, 2009), therefore the differences in the group can be 
assumed to be equal. Second, avoidance goals and group were compared. Again all 
z-scores were within the acceptable criterion and Levene’s homogeneity of variance 
was non-significant (p>.05)  
(i) Goal expectancy (approach expectancy and avoidance expectancy) and group 
(depressed vs non-depressed) 
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Again two separate t-tests were conducted to more closely examine the 
interaction effect between goal expectancy and group. First approach expectancy 
and group were compared. All z-scores were within the acceptable criterion and 
homogeneity of variance can be assumed (p>.05, Field, 2009). Second avoidance 
expectancy and group were compared. Again all z-scores were within the acceptable 
criterion and homogeneity of variance can be assumed (p>.05) 
(i)  Goal adjustment and group 
The z-scores for goal re-engagement and goal disengagement were within the 
acceptable criterion. In addition, equal variance can be assumed for both goal re-
engagement and goal disengagement as reported by Levene’s test for homogeneity 
of variance (p>.05, Field, 2009). 
Regression analyses 
 
Prior to conducting meditational analysis, data were checked for normally 
distributed residuals and homoscedasticity (Field, 2009).  In order to check these 
assumptions, Histograms (Figure, 1), P-Plots (Figure 2) and scatterplots (Figure, 3) 
were also conducted.  
First, goal re-engagement and metacognitive ruminative beliefs were tested 
as predictors of depression (PHQ-9 total). The regression residuals were normally 
distributed (Figure 1) and homoscedasticity (Figure 3) was within the acceptable 
criterion (Field, 2009). All residuals were within the acceptable criterion standardised 
residuals<2.5, range=-1.67, 1.94 and Cooks distance<1 range=.00, .32 (Field, 2009).  
Second, goal disengagement and metacognitive ruminative beliefs were 
tested as predictors of depression. The regression residuals were normally 
distributed (see figure X) and homoscedasticity (see figure x) was within the 
  
 
 
 
107 
acceptable criterion (Field, 2005). All residuals were within the acceptable criterion 
(zresiduals< 2.5; range=-1.54, 2.31) and (Cooks distance<2.5; range=.00, .27)  (Field, 
2005). 
Figure 1. Histogram of standardised residuals (goal re-engagement and 
metacognitive ruminative beleifs) and PHQ-9 total (dependent variable) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. P-P plot of regression standardised residual for dependent PHQ-9 total 
(dependent variable) 
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Figure 3. Scatterplot of regression standardised residual, regression standardised 
predicted value for PHQ-9 total (dependent variable)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Histogram of standardised residuals (goal disengagement and 
metacognitive ruminative beliefs) and PHQ-9 total (dependent variable) 
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Figure 5. P-P plot of regression standardised residual for dependent PHQ-9 total 
(dependent variable) 
 
Figure 6. Scatterplot of regression standardised residual, regression standardised 
predicted value for PHQ-9 total (dependent variable) 
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Appendix C 
 
Version 2 15/04/13 
 
 
 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM  
 
 
 
 
          
Participant Name                                                Date                   Signature 
 
 
 
 
       
      Researcher                                                        Date                   Signature 
 
 
 
Title of Research Project: Goal processes and depression 
 
 
Please 
initial box 
Researcher:  Christian O’Dea 
1. I confirm that I have read and have understood the information sheet for the above study. I 
have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these 
answered satisfactorily.   
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time 
without giving any reason, without my rights or treatment being affected.    
3. I understand that, under the Data Protection Act,  I can ask for access to the information I 
provide and I can also request the destruction of that information, if I so wish. 
 
 
4. I understand that confidentialty would be broken if information I gave suggested that I or 
someone else was at risk of harm. 
 
 
5. I agree to take part in the above study.    
  
6. I understand that relevant data collected during the study, may be looked at by individuals 
from The University of Liverpool, from regulatory authorities or from the NHS Trust, where it 
is relevant to my taking part in this research. I give permission for these individuals to have 
access to this data. 
 
Office use only: 
Participant no. P 
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Version 1 15/04/13 
 
 
 
 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM  
 
 
 
 
 
          
Participant Name                                               Date                   Signature 
 
 
 
 
       
      Researcher                                                        Date                   Signature
Title of Research Project: Goal profiles and processes  
 
 
Please 
initial box 
Researcher:  Christian O’Dea 
1. I confirm that I have read and have understood the information sheet for the 
above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions 
and have had these answered satisfactorily.   
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time without giving any reason.    
3. I understand that, under the Data Protection Act,  I can ask for access to the 
information I provide and I can also request the destruction of that information, if I 
so wish. 
 
 
4. I understand that confidentialty would be broken if information I gave suggested 
that I or someone else was at risk of harm. 
 
 
5. I agree to take part in the above study.    
  
6. I understand that relevant data collected during the study, may be looked at by 
individuals from The University of Liverpool.  
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Version 5 29/10/13  
 
 
 
 
 
                               Personal Goals and Goal processes 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Thank you for taking the time to consider participating in this research project. 
Before you decide whether you would like to take part it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time 
to read the following information carefully. 
 
This information sheet explains the purpose of the study and what will happen if you 
take part. If there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information 
before you make a decision, please ask the researcher. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
Goal pursuit and goal motivation has been linked to wellbeing and depression. 
Previous research has highlighted the need for further exploration of goal motivation 
in depression. Personal goals play a fundamental factor in therapeutic engagement 
and are key to maintaining long term behaviour.  
 
Understanding goal processes linked to these difficulties may potentially provide a 
greater understanding of goals and the management of goals within depression 
leading to the development of more effective clinical approaches to the treatment of 
these difficulties. 
 
The study aims to explore goal motivation within adults with depression presenting 
at an NHS primary care talking therapy service. The type of goals individuals pursue 
and how they think about their goals will be explored. 
 
Why have I been asked to take part? 
 
You have been asked to take part in the study following your referral to a NHS 
primary care talking therapy service. The NHS service which you have been referred 
to has agreed to be a recruitment site for this research project. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
No. You can decide not to take part in the study. Your participation is entirely 
voluntary and you can stop taking part at any point without giving a reason. The 
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results you have given up to the point you decide to withdraw may be used unless 
you request that they are destroyed. Your decision to take part or not will have no 
detrimental effect on the therapy or the service you receive from the NHS service. 
 
What would it involve? 
 
Initially you will be invited to provide permission for the researcher (Christian O’Dea) 
to discuss with you the research and identify presenting problems. This will also be 
an opportunity to ask any questions relating to the study. If you agree to take part in 
the study the researcher will arrange a convenient time and place to meet to 
complete the measures. The researcher will be able to offer the clinic at which you 
attend sessions, home visits or alternatively you could attend the University of 
Liverpool to complete the measures with the researcher. The study will involve 
completing 2 brief timed tasks and 4 short questionnaires. The questionnaires will 
help identify goals and processes linked to goal management. Participation is 
expected to take about 45 minutes. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
 
Yes. All information you provide will be kept completely confidential. All personal 
information (e.g. your name and the name of the service) or anything else which 
might identify you will be removed so that no-one will know who you are. The 
information that you provide will not be shared with anyone in the service. No 
names will be used in any reports that are written. 
 
The only exception to confidentiality is if the information that you provide suggests 
that you or someone else may be at risk of harm. In the extremely rare 
circumstances when this does happen the researcher will make every effort to 
discuss this with you first. 
 
If you decide to take part in the free draw (more details below) then your name and 
contact details will be entered onto a password protected database but this will 
remain separate from the information you provide. 
 
Are there any benefits to taking part in the research?  
 
As a thank you to you for agreeing to take part you will be given the option to enter 
into a draw for one of twelve £10 gift vouchers 
 
Are there any risks/disadvantages to helping with this research? 
 
There are no known risks to taking part in this research the only disadvantage to you 
will be the time it takes to participate which is estimated to be about 45 minutes. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
 
All research in the NHS is looked at by independent group of people, called a 
  
 
 
 
115 
Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed 
and approved by a research committee at The University of Liverpool. 
 
Who has funded this study? 
 
This study has been funded by the Northwest Strategic Health Authority via the 
Doctorate of Clinical Psychology Programme, Division of Clinical Psychology, 
University of Liverpool. 
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
 
The results of this study will be written up as a thesis which is in partial fulfilment of 
the principal researcher’s qualification of Doctor of Clinical Psychology. In addition, it 
is hoped that it will be written up as publication in a relevant scientific journal and 
presented at a conference. However, you will not be identifiable in any publication 
that is produced. 
 
At the end of your participation the researcher will ask you whether you would like 
to be sent a summary of the results when the research has been completed. If you 
would like a copy of the results he will take an address from you. 
 
What if I am unhappy or if there is a problem? 
 
If you are unhappy, or have a problem, please contact Christian O’Dea on 
(chris1@liv.ac.uk) and he will try his best to answer your questions. If you remain 
unhappy you can contact Dr Joanne Dickson (Christian O’Dea’s research supervisor) 
via 0151 794 5534 or via email (jdickson@liverpool.ac.uk). 
 
Who can I contact if I have further questions? 
 
Please contact Christian O’Dea via phone (0151 7945534) or email (chris1@liv.ac.uk) 
if you have any further questions. 
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Version 2 07/05/13 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             Personal goals and goal processes  
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Thank you for taking the time to consider participating in this research project. 
Before you decide whether you would like to take part it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time 
to read the following information carefully.  
 
This information sheet explains the purpose of the study and what will happen if you 
take part. If there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information 
before you make a decision, please ask the researcher. 
 
What is the purpose of the study?  
 
Personal goals are personally meaningful objectives individuals pursue in their daily 
lives. Goals have been linked to a number of important factors, including wellbeing. 
The study will seek to further explore how individuals manage their personal goals. 
The study will be comparing your personal goals with individuals currently 
experiencing depression. This is based on previous research which suggests a 
difference in the goal pursuit between depressed and non-depressed individuals.  
 
Why have I been asked to take part? 
You have been asked to take part in the study to explore your personal goals and 
management of these goals. You have also been asked as you are not experiencing 
mental health difficulties. 
 
Do I have to take part?  
No. You can decide not to take part in the study. Your participation is entirely 
voluntary and you can stop taking part at any point without giving a reason. The 
results you have given up to the point you decide to withdraw may be used unless 
you request that they are destroyed.  
 
What would it involve?  
 
If you agree to take part in the study the researcher will arrange a convenient time 
and place to meet to complete the measures. The researcher will be able to offer 
home visits or alternatively you could attend the University of Liverpool to complete 
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the measures with the researcher. The study will involve completing 2 brief timed 
tasks and 2 short questionnaires. The questionnaires will help identify goals and 
processes linked to goal management. Participation is expected to take about 45 
minutes.  
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Yes. All information you provide will be kept completely confidential. All personal 
information or anything else which might identify you will be removed so that no-
one will know who you are. No names will be used in any reports that are written. 
 
The only exception to confidentiality is if the information that you provide suggests 
that you or someone else may be at risk of harm. In the extremely rare 
circumstances when this does happen the researcher will make every effort to 
discuss this with you first.  
 
If you decide to take part in the free draw (more details below) then your name and 
contact details will be entered onto a password protected database but this will 
remain separate from the information you provide.  
 
Are there any benefits to taking part in the research? 
As a thank you to you for agreeing to take part you will be given the option to enter 
into a draw for one of twelve £10 gift vouchers 
 
Are there any risks/disadvantages to helping with this research? 
There are no known risks to taking part in this research the only disadvantage to you 
will be the time it takes to participate which is estimated to be about 45 minutes.  
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
All research in the NHS is looked at by independent group of people, called a 
Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study was reviewed by 
the NRES Committee London – Fulham. Also, this study has been reviewed and 
approved by a research committee at The University of Liverpool. 
 
Who has funded this study? 
This study has been funded by the Northwest Strategic Health Authority via the 
Doctorate of Clinical Psychology Programme, Division of Clinical Psychology, 
University of Liverpool.  
 
What will happen to the results of the study?  
The results of this study will be written up as a thesis which is in partial fulfilment of 
the principal researcher’s qualification of Doctor of Clinical Psychology. In addition, it 
is hoped that it will be written up as publication in a relevant scientific journal and 
presented at a conference. However, you will not be identifiable in any publication 
that is produced.  
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At the end of your participation the researcher will ask you whether you would like 
to be sent a summary of the results when the research has been completed. If you 
would like a copy of the results he will take an address from you.  
 
What if I am unhappy or if there is a problem?  
If you are unhappy, or have a problem, please contact Christian O’Dea on 
(chris1@liv.ac.uk) and he will try his best to answer your questions. If you remain 
unhappy you can contact Dr Joanne Dickson (Christian O’Dea’s research supervisor) 
via 0151 794 5534 or via email (jdickson@liverpool.ac.uk).  
 
Who can I contact if I have further questions?  
Please contact Christian O’Dea via phone (0151 7945534) or email (chris1@liv.ac.uk) 
if you have any further questions. 
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Appendix D 
 
NBRS 
Instructions: Most people experience depressive thoughts at times. When 
depressive thinking is prolonged and repetitive it is called rumination. This 
questionnaire is concerned about the beliefs that people have about rumination. 
Listed below are a number of these beliefs. Please read each belief carefully and 
indicate how much you generally agree with each one. Please circle the number that 
best describes your answer. Please respond to all of the items. 
 
 
 Do not 
agree 
Agree slightly  Agree 
moderately 
Agree very 
much 
1. Ruminating makes me 
physically ill 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
2. When I ruminate I can’t 
do anything else 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
3. Ruminating means I’m 
out of control 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
4. Everyone would desert 
me if they knew how  
much I ruminate about 
myself 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
4 
5. People will reject me if I 
ruminate 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
6. Ruminating about my 
problems is 
uncontrollable 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
7. Ruminating about my 
depression could make me 
kill myself 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
8. Ruminating will turn me 
into a failure 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
9. I cannot stop myself 
from ruminating 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
10. Ruminating means I’m 
a bad person 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
11. It is impossible not to 
ruminate about the bad 
things that have happened 
in the past 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
4 
12. Only weak people 
ruminate 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
13. Ruminating can  
make me harm myself 
 
1 2 3 4 
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PBRS 
Instructions: Most people experience depressive thoughts at times. When 
depressive thinking is prolonged and repetitive it is called rumination. This 
questionnaire is concerned about the beliefs that people have about rumination. 
Listed below are a number of these beliefs. Please read each belief carefully and 
indicate how much you generally agree with each one. Please circle the number that 
best describes your answer. Please respond to all of the items. 
 
 
 
 Do not 
agree 
Agree slightly  Agree 
moderately 
Agree very 
much 
1. In order to understand 
my feelings of 
depression I need to 
ruminate about my 
problems 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
2. I need to ruminate 
about the bad things that 
have happened in the past 
to make sense of 
them 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
3. I need to ruminate 
about my problems to find 
the causes of my 
depression 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
4. Ruminating about my 
problems helps me to 
focus on the most 
important things 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
4 
5. Ruminating about the 
past helps me to 
prevent future mistakes 
and failures 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
6. I need to ruminate 
about my problems to find 
answers to my depression 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
7. Ruminating about my 
feelings helps me to 
recognise the triggers for 
my depression 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
8. Ruminating about my 
depression helps me to 
understand past mistakes 
and failures 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
9. Ruminating about the 
past helps me to work 
out how things could have 
been done better 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
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GAS 
 
Instructions- During their lives people cannot always attain what they want and are 
sometimes forced to stop pursuing the goals they have set. We are interested in 
understanding how you usually react when this happens to you. Please indicate to 
which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements, as it applies to 
you  
 
If I have to stop 
pursuing an 
important goal in 
my life 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
1. It’s easy for  
me to reduce my 
effort towards 
the goal 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
5 
2. I convince 
myself that I have 
other meaningful 
goals to pursue 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
5 
3. I stay 
committed to the 
goal for a long 
time; I can’t let it 
go 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
5 
4. I start working 
on other new 
goals 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
5 
5. I think about 
other new goals 
to pursue 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
6. I find it difficult 
to stop trying to 
achieve the goal 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
5 
7. I seek other 
meaningful goals 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
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8. It’s easy for me 
to stop thinking 
about the goal 
and let it go  
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
5 
9. I tell myself 
that I have a 
number of other 
new goals to 
draw upon 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
10. I put effort 
toward other 
meaningful goals 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
5 
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PHQ-9 
 
Over the last 2 weeks, how 
often have you been 
bothered by any of the 
following problems? 
Not at all Several days More than half 
the days 
Nearly 
every day 
1. Little interest or 
pleasure in doing things 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
2. Feeling down, 
depressed, or hopeless 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
3.Trouble falling/staying 
asleep, sleeping too much 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
3 
4. Feeling tired or having 
little energy 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
5.Poor appetite or 
overeating 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
6. Feeling bad about 
yourself – or that you are a 
failure or have let yourself 
or your family down. 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
3 
7.Trouble concentrating on 
things, such as reading the 
newspaper 
or watching television. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
8.Moving or speaking so 
slowly that other people 
could have noticed. 
Or the opposite – being so 
fidgety or restless that you 
have been 
moving around a lot more 
than usual. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
9.Thoughts that you would 
be better off dead or of 
hurting 
yourself in some way. 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
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Appendix E 
 
 
Instructions for Authors 
Motivation and Emotion 
Motivation and Emotion publishes articles that focus on motivational and 
emotional phenomenon. The journal seeks to publish articles that make a theoretical 
advance by linking empirical findings to underlying processes. Submissions to the 
journal should speak to an important problem in motivation and emotion study, and 
they should offer theory-based directional hypotheses. 
Published articles are almost always explanatory rather than merely 
descriptive, as they provide the data necessary to understand the origins of 
motivation and emotion, to explicate why, how, and under what conditions 
motivational and emotional states change, and to document that motivational and 
emotional processes are important to human functioning. Essentially, articles that 
are excellent candidates for the pages of Motivation and Emotion are those that use 
and develop theory to explain the field’s core concepts—human needs, cognitive 
and neural states capable of energizing and directing action, emotion, affect, and 
mood. Submissions in which motivational or emotional states are only incidental are 
not good candidates for publication. 
A range of methodological approaches are welcomed, but methodological 
rigor generally speaking is the key criterion. 
The focus should be on human motivation and emotion. Any submission that 
utilizes non-human participants should be able to contribute to understanding 
human motivation and emotion. 
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Blind Review Policy 
Motivation and Emotion relies on a masked review policy, which means that 
the identities of the authors are unknown (“blinded”) to the reviewers and also that 
the identities of the reviewers are unknown to the authors. To conform to this 
policy, the authors’ names and affiliations should not appear on the title page and 
self-referenced work, such as “in our earlier study, Smith and colleagues (2012)…”, 
should not appear in the text of the manuscript. 
 
Manuscript Style 
Submissions are to be formatted according to APA style, as detailed in: 
 
APA (2010). Publication manual of the American Psychological Association, 6th 
edition. American Psychological Association: Washington, DC. 
 
Submissions should be structured as follows: 
A Title Page lists the title of the manuscript but omits the authors’ names, 
affiliations, and author notes. 
An Abstract of 120 to 160 words offers information about the purpose of the 
paper, the sample and procedures, key results, and a clear statement of the 
implications of the findings. Below the Abstract, supply 4 or 5 keywords or brief 
phrases. 
An Introduction introduces the research problem and explains why it is 
important. It describes relevant theory and past research, and provides testable, 
directional hypotheses. 
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A Method appears in subsections. A Participants section identifies the 
research participants and their demographic characteristics. A Procedures or 
Research Design section provides the timeline of events within the conduct of the 
study and states the experimental conditions or data analysis plan. A Measures 
section provides the measures used in the collection of the data and offers evidence 
of the psychometric properties of those measures. 
The Results reports the analyses performed and the result of the statistic 
tests, especially those related to the hypotheses. Generally speaking, descriptive 
statistics are provided in tables or figures whereas the report of the statistical tests 
appears in the text. 
The Discussion evaluates and interprets the findings and states their 
implications. The section should not simply reiterate the findings. Instead, it 
interprets the findings, integrates them into both theory and the existing empirical 
literature, offers suggestions for future research, acknowledges the limitations of the 
research, and addresses alternative interpretations. 
A Conclusion section is optional. If provided, it should be a brief (usually a 
single paragraph) section that explicitly states the contribution of the study and it 
move the research literature significantly forward. 
Many papers will feature multiple experiments. For these submissions, the 
arrangement of sections reflects the above structure but includes additional 
headings such as “Study 1”, “Study 2”, and “Study 3”. Each study is to include its own 
Introduction, Method, Results, and Discussion sections. 
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For References, Footnotes, Tables, and Figures, follow the guidelines of the 
APA Publication manual. An Appendix may be an appropriate final section to provide 
stimulus materials or the items within a newly-developed questionnaire. 
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